

AD-A255 310

1 PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188Public report
gathering or
collection of
Davis High

For user response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering of information, send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503

1. AGENCY (Include Office)		2. REPORT DATE 5 June 1992		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis, 16Aug91-5Jun92	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Does The All-Volunteer Force Need National Service?				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Daniel J. Busby, USA					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) DTIC ELECTE SEP 03 1992 S B D				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study investigates whether it is feasible for national service projects to dovetail with military peacetime contingency missions so that the All-Volunteer Force can enhance its capabilities by supporting national service. Although peacetime contingency missions have increased in importance, the military has chosen to ignore potential help on these missions from national service programs. Evidence developed in this paper suggests that three national service programs authorized in The National and Community Service Act of 1990: the American Conservation Corps, the National and Community Service Act Programs, and the Peace Corps, can effectively assist the military in performing the peacetime contingency missions of disaster relief, emergency assistance, and reconstitution. Military logistical and organizational support for these service programs will improve the military's capability to accomplish peacetime contingency missions.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS National Service; Peacetime Contingency Missions; All-Volunteer Force; Conservation Corps				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 139	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT		

DOES THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE NEED NATIONAL SERVICE?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DANIEL JAMES BUSBY, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, New York, 1978
M.B.A., Pacific Lutheran University, Washington, 1985
M.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1992

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

92 9 02 239

92-24530



15/84

077260

DOES THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE NEED NATIONAL SERVICE?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DANIEL JAMES BUSBY, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, New York, 1978
M.B.A., Pacific Lutheran University, Washington, 1985
M.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


THESIS APPROVAL PAGE


Name of Candidate: Major Daniel J. Busby

Title of Thesis: DOES THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE NEED NATIONAL SERVICE?


Approved by:


COL Alan D. Hobson, M.S., Thesis Committee Chairman


LTC Harold L. Hunter, M.A., Member


COL Gerald W. McLaughlin, Ph.D., Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 5th day of June 1992 by:


Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DOES THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE NEED NATIONAL SERVICE? by MAJ
Daniel J. Busby, USA, 139 pages.

This study investigates whether it is feasible for national service projects to dovetail with military peacetime contingency missions so that the All-Volunteer Force can enhance its capabilities by supporting national service. Although peacetime contingency missions have increased in importance, the military has chosen to ignore potential help on these missions from national service programs. Evidence developed in this paper suggests that three national service programs authorized in The National and Community Service Act of 1990: the American Conservation Corps, the National and Community Service Act Programs, and the Peace Corps, can effectively assist the military in performing the peacetime contingency missions of disaster relief, emergency assistance, and reconstitution. Military logistical and organizational support for these service programs will improve the military's capability to accomplish peacetime contingency missions.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
GLOSSARY	viii
Chapter	
1. INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT OF THESIS QUESTIONS .	1
Purpose of Thesis	11
Assumptions	14
Limitations	16
Delimitations	18
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	20
Historical Perspective	20
Social Perspective	23
Military Perspective	26
Economic Perspective	26
3. METHODOLOGY	30
4. ANALYSIS	33
Military Mission Development	33
Defense Priorities	38
National Service	43
Decoupling National Service and the AVF . . .	46
National Service Missions	49
National Service Structure	53
National Service Program Initiatives	60

Provisions of the Act	64
School-aged Service Programs	65
The American Conservation and Youth Service Corps	76
Origins of Conservation Programs	81
Military Usefulness of Conservation Programs	82
Costs of Youth Programs	85
Reconstitution and Conservation Programs . .	94
National and Community Service Act	106
Governors' Innovative Service Programs . . .	115
Peace Corps and Action	115
Other Volunteer Programs	122
5. CONCLUSION	124
Areas for Further Research	129
BIBLIOGRAPHY	132
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	139

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Selected Militaries and National Service	19
2. Trends Shaping the Global Security System . . .	35
3. Military Peacetime Contingency Missions	42
4. DoD Active Non-prior Service Accession Successes	47
5. Active Army Accessions, Mental Categories and High School Diplomas	48
6. Unmet Social Needs in the United States	51
7. Volunteer Work Needed to Be Done	52
8. National Service Programs Vs. Peacetime Contingency Missions	63
9. Efficacy of Using School-aged Service Programs to Perform Peacetime Contingency Missions . .	68
10. Efficacy of Using The American Conservation and Youth Service Corps Programs to Perform Peacetime Contingency Missions	79
11. Efficacy of Using National and Community Service Act Programs to Perform Peacetime Contingency Missions	107
12. Cost Estimates of Several Large Scale National Service Programs	109
13. Efficacy of Using the Peace Corps to Perform Peacetime Contingency Missions	117
14. Useful National Service Programs	126

Figure	LIST OF FIGURES	Page
1. Projections of Eighteen-Year-Olds		7
2. DoD Accessions and Eighteen-Year-Olds		50
3. The Commission on National and Community Service		56
4. Regional Structure of the National Service Program		59
5. Supervision of the Peace Corps		119
6. Foreign Assistance Operations		121

GLOSSARY

The Act. Refers to The National and Community Service Act of 1990; signed into law on November 16, 1990.

Armed Forces. Is interchangeable with "services" and "military." They refer to all active and reserve military branches of the uniformed services, to include the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard.

Commission. Refers to the Commission on National and Community Service established under The National and Community Service Act of 1990.

Disaster relief. Refers to U.S. government interagency assistance to a domestic or foreign locality, people, or government because of some natural or manmade calamity.

Emergency assistance. Refers to immediate, short-term aid to victims of a crisis event.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). Refers to operations that provide a mechanism through which U.S. military personnel and assets assist Third World populations. HCA improves the quality of life.¹

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Refers to political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above routine, peaceful competition among states.²

Nation assistance. Refers to DoD health, technical, management, and other assistance provided to another

¹Regina Gaillard, "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations," Military Review 71, no. 6 (June 1991): 31.

²United States Army, FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), Glossary-5.

country at their request. DoD works in concert with, and is under the leadership of, other U.S. agencies.

National service. Unless otherwise stated as compulsory service, refers to voluntary participation in public and community service projects and includes both military and civic activities.

Peacetime contingencies. Refer to politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war.³

Program Agency. Refers to a Federal or State agency designated to manage a youth corps program.

Program. Refers to an activity carried out with assistance provided under The National and Community Service Act of 1990.

Project. Refers to an activity that results in a specific identifiable service or product that otherwise would not be done with existing funds, and that does not duplicate the routine services or functions of the employer to whom participants are assigned.⁴

Reconstitution. Refers to the ability to rebuild military forces required to protect vital U.S. interests. Includes the capability to mobilize and train military manpower and energize the industrial base to produce sufficient materiel in order to sustain major combat operations.⁵

Reserve Component. Interchangeable with Reserve. They refer to all reserve forces, to include all units and personnel in the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.

³Ibid., Glossary-6.

⁴United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 101st Cong., 2d Session, Volume 7, Public Law 101-610 [S.1430] (St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co., 1991), 3131.

⁵United States Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense: Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1991), 5; and David E. Jeremiah, quoted in "Joint and Combined Environments," Student Text 20-15 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), 94.

Security assistance. Refers to a group of programs authorized by U.S. statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives.⁶

Service Opportunity. Refers to a program or project that uses students or out-of-school youth to perform meaningful and constructive service in agencies, institutions, and situations where application of human talent and dedication may help to meet human, educational, linguistic, and environmental community needs, especially those relating to poverty.⁷

Youth Corps Program. Refers to a program that offers full-time, productive work with visible community benefits in a natural resource or human service setting and that gives participants a mix of work experience, basic and life skills, education, training, and support services.⁸

⁶United States Army, FM 100-20, Glossary-7.

⁷United States Code, Public Law 101-610, 3131.

⁸Ibid., 3132.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT OF THESIS QUESTIONS

Should the United States (U.S.) military support a national service program? Can national service support military requirements? The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the issue of national service and determine whether the military should support a national service program. The research question that this thesis will answer is this: is it feasible for national service projects to dovetail with military peacetime contingency missions so that the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) can enhance its capabilities by supporting national service? Discussing national service is not merely a rhetorical exercise reserved for polemics. There is nothing sacrosanct about the current way the country performs its peacetime contingency missions and employs its military forces.

In the late 1980s many alarms were sounded about the dire outlook for an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Economic forecasting models predicted that in the 1990s the U.S. faced prospects of smaller youth manpower pools, improving economic conditions, and shrinking defense manpower budgets.

Manpower experts predicted that future military recruiting options were very bleak.¹ As a consequence, several government policy makers proposed that the country consider possible alternatives to the AVF.

Proposed alternatives to the AVF center around two types of programs: conscription and national service. Although there are some active supporters for a return to a peacetime draft, such conscription is usually dismissed out-of-hand as politically unfeasible and anathema to American values. To reinstitute compulsory service, as conventional wisdom goes, the country must be faced with a compelling threat that unites the populace and clearly threatens vital national interests.

Although the constitutionality of national conscription is well established, for all intents and purposes the draft is dead. The penalty for legislators supporting conscription in absence of a clear national

¹Numerous studies completed in the 1980s predicted recruiting problems in the early 1990s. Typical examples include J. Colin K. Ash, Bernard Udis, and Robert F. McNown, "Enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force: A Military Personnel Supply Model and Its Forecasts," American Economic Review 73, no. 1 (March 1983): 145-55; and William J. Taylor, Jr., Robert N. Kupperman, et al., Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000: Executive Summary, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Oct. 1981 - Nov. 1982). For an exhaustive list of personnel retention models see Curtis L. Gilroy, ed., et al., Military Compensation and Personnel Retention (Alexandria, VA: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1991), 397-408.

threat is likely to be a political defeat, therefore, the issue has become a political pariah.² Representative Dave McCurdy (D-Okla), chief sponsor in the House of Representatives for the National and Community Service Act of 1990, has neatly summarized the sentiment in Congress for a return to a national draft. He stated that there are no plans for a

mandatory, compulsory, uniformed military or service plan. There is no draft out there. No one is talking about it. There is no way in the world we could ever find jobs for the 3.5 million young people who go over that eighteen-year-old threshold. No one in his right mind is advocating that.³

That leaves national service, in all its forms, as the primary potential alternative to the AVF in the foreseeable future.

There is strong support for national service at many levels of government. The issue of national service has been addressed by every single session of Congress from 1973 to 1991. In 1989, nine bills were introduced in the Senate and eleven in the House of Representatives to establish one form or another of national service. Finally, in 1990 Congress made the necessary compromises and President George Bush signed The National and Community Service Act of 1990

²Richard Danzig and Peter Szanton, National Service: What Would It Mean? (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), 166.

³Williamson M. Evers, ed., National Service: Pro and Con (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 76.

(henceforth called the Act), a bill that expanded some volunteer service programs and called for the initiation of a pilot national service program. President Bush has also encouraged voluntary service to the country in his Points of Light Initiative Foundation. Clearly, interest in national service is high.

The degree of cooperation on the issue of national service is unprecedented in our country's history. Prior to World War II there were only two prominent proposals for national service. One was introduced by World War I-era veterans who favored a peacetime draft. The other major proposal was by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who favored civilian labor conscription. Labor union leaders successfully portrayed President Roosevelt's proposals as "forced labor" bills and the bills went nowhere.⁴ Although national service was supported by Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter, wide-spread political support has never existed throughout the nation. Nowadays, many people on all sides of the political spectrum support national service.

Even compulsory national service, also known as universal service, has received some favorable press. A flurry of articles and reports have appeared in print which recommend that all citizens render the country a period of

⁴Ibid., xxi.

service. One public opinion poll in the spring of 1991 showed that 64.7 percent of respondents supported the idea that all eighteen-year-old, able body Americans should be required to participate in some form of national service for one year.⁵ However, a compulsory national service might not be constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. A compulsory program would also suffer from many of the same political liabilities as a draft, therefore, it is politically implausible that such a program could be initiated. This leaves voluntary national service as the most feasible alternative to the AVF.

Voluntary national service is envisioned by some as a panacea for correcting problems of the military. Young people would volunteer, out of a sense of service and civic responsibility, to serve either in the military or in a civilian job. In fact, young people tend to favor a system of voluntary national service: 83 percent of those asked in a national poll favored the idea.⁶ In return for their services, volunteers would receive a stipend, living allowances, training, and education benefits.

⁵Reported in the advertising supplement "Rediscover America," Money 20 (November 1991): 13.


⁶George Gallup Jr., "National Service," The Gallup Report, no. 267 (December 1987): 21.

Benefits of national service to the country are enticing. The military would receive an abundance of recruits (through preferential benefits it could offer) and the country would address unmet social needs, fill the military ranks, and impart civic pride and a sense of responsibility in its youth. However, despite these benefits, the *raison d'etat* for national service, its usefulness in bailing out the AVF, is less obvious today. Since the late-1980s many global events have occurred that have ameliorated the predicted problems facing the AVF and changed the nature of the national service debate.

In the past, the main impetus for national service, and real reason for its implied urgency, was the predicted troubles for the AVF. Again, these perceived troubles revolve around potential recruiting problems, competition from industry, and smaller DoD budgets. There is growing evidence that these problem areas will be safely traversed by the AVF.

The military will not have a serious recruiting problem in the near future because of a declining youth cohort. A potential shortage of volunteers was the stated reason for various national service proposals that date back to the 1970s. The support for this argument comes from Commerce Department projections of the number of eighteen-year-olds in the U.S. during the 1990s; these projections are shown in Figure 1. The Democratic Leadership Council

Figure 1
Projections of Eighteen-Year-Olds



(DLC) in the late 1980s also stressed this rationale in supporting national service. The DLC alluded to this "demographic squeeze" as justification for national service in order to channel youths into the military.

The probability of a "demographic squeeze" occurring is unlikely. Because of changes in the national security environment, the U.S., by mid-decade, will downsize existing military forces and have 25 percent fewer personnel than in 1991. Consequently, the military will recruit a smaller percentage of the eligible youth cohort in the future. A smaller AVF requires fewer accessions. For instance, the military had to enlist 42 percent of all eligible eighteen-year-olds in 1981, in 1991, 55 percent.⁷ The 1995 eligible percentage will be 40 percent.⁸ Lower manpower requirements have mitigated perceived problems facing the AVF by easing competition for a shrinking manpower pool. Fortunately, declining requirements of anticipated accessions for the next five years exceed the rate of decline of the youth cohort.

⁷Evers, 65.

⁸This assumes constant recruiting standards, 25 percent fewer accessions in 1995 than in 1991, and 60 percent of all youths in a given cohort are unfit for military service. See National Defense University, The Anthro Factor in Warfare: Conscripts, Volunteers, and Reserves (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 297.

Competition from industry should not cause a recruiting shortfall in the military. For instance, by 1995 the population of eighteen-year-olds is expected to increase by 2.8 percent, the high-school graduation rate is expected to remain close to 85 percent for that age group, freshmen college enrollment is expected to fall by 2 percent, and rate of growth of the civilian labor market is expected to be 1.2 percent.⁹ These trends imply that there will be more, not fewer, eighteen-year-olds available to recruit into the military by 1995. All else being equal, the anemic economy and soaring college costs will continue to pump recruits into the military.

The U.S. budget crisis will certainly cause the military to reduce manpower but it will not impair the AVF's ability to recruit quality youths. In order to lower government spending, many legislators are calling for a "peace dividend" -- a diversion of defense spending to non-military programs because of the mitigated threat. Reducing military budgets, particularly personnel accounts, is an attractive way to reduce government spending. After all, personnel costs equal 27 percent of the current defense

⁹United States Commerce Department, Projections of the Population of the United States, by Age, Sex, and Race: 1988-2080, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, no. 1018, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989): 33-88; and United States Commerce Department, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Tables 207, 248, and 651 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991).

budget and reductions in personnel realize dollar savings in the current year. The planned 25 percent reduction in military manpower levels strikes at the segment of the DoD budget that has historically grown the fastest. But Defense officials have emphatically announced that they will maintain the high quality of the military and will not allow a "hollow" force to develop.¹⁰ Recruiting officials plan to keep a viable set of enlistment packages, indexed pay levels, and the Montgomery G.I. Bill. The current set of enlistment incentives will keep the military competitive in attracting quality people despite a falling DoD budget.

The compelling, historical rationale for national service, the military's need to recruit for an AVF, is now missing. The need to bolster the AVF is abating. Yet even after the huge success enjoyed by the AVF against Iraq in Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield, the issue of national service as an alternative, or at least a supplement, to the AVF still receives public attention.¹¹ With the popularity of the AVF at an all time high and prior recruiting troubles apparently behind it, is it time to put an end to a call for national service?

¹⁰Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Pi Sigma Alpha Lecture, 29 August 1991, American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., carried on C-SPAN.

¹¹For example, see Casper W. Weinberger, "Commentary on Events at Home and Abroad," Forbes, April 15, 1991, 33.

Purpose Of Thesis

Calls for national service are still popular today but the nature of the debate has changed. No longer are the woes of the military the primary justification for calls to national service. The link between the two seems to have been severed. Supporters of national service cite both civic and military reasons as justification for some type of national service.

Supporters of national service argue that even without a military need for such service, there are ample civilian requirements to justify a national program. Proponents believe that national service is needed to instill a sense of civic pride and responsibility in the young and channel their energies into combatting drug abuse, protecting the environment, caring for the sick and elderly, and serving in other capacities that address dire social needs. They also argue that the young must be taught to help others, thereby learning to help themselves.

The historic link between national service and the AVF may have been severed; is it time to forge a new link? The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the issue of national service and determine whether the military should support a national service program. At various times the military has both wanted and feared national service as a replacement for the AVF. This may be time to look at national service in a new light.

It is easy for the military to ignore the interest in national service. The AVF is popular after success in Southwest Asia and, despite the interest in Congress for national service, there is no apparent groundswell of support for national service among the public. Although people express interest in national service, few serve. Very few people can agree on a specific program; everyone seems to have their own view of what national service should look like. The National and Community Service Act of 1990 does not even mention DoD participation outside of some minor logistical support for conservation efforts. The military can ignore the Act with impunity; but should it?

The military does not simply lack focus on the issue of national service; nor should its position be confused with indifference. Throughout most of the 1980s and into the 1990s, the military has been hostile to national service. Its position has remained relatively unchanged for the last decade and supports the viewpoint of

President Jimmy Carter's 1980 report on selective service reform [which] said that the President saw as "deleterious" to the military's morale, discipline, and enlistment efforts a civilian program that would compete with the military for the "same pool" of qualified persons.¹²

A more recent example of the military's view of national service was expressed by Grant Green, the Assistant

¹²Evers, xl.

Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel. In testimony before Congress, he stated that

national service legislation would reduce recruit quality, increase training costs, and adversely affect the productivity of military personnel, as well as increase minority participation in the armed forces.¹³

The military's antagonism towards national service, or at a minimum, its position of benign neglect, may well be shortsighted at best, and possibly self-defeating. With severe force reductions and budget cuts now etched on stone tablets, national service may have something to offer the AVF. As global warfare is replaced with regional conflict as the greatest security threat to U.S. interests, and as peacetime contingency missions assume greater importance and consume more military resources, a tailored national service program might offer resources and manpower to supplement or even replace military resources.

The research question to answer is this: is it feasible for national service projects to dovetail with peacetime contingency missions so that the AVF can enhance its capabilities by supporting national service? If so, would that allow the military to concentrate declining resources on wartime mission-training and less on other missions? If the main mission of the military is to train for the next war, and by so doing, deter hostilities, could

¹³Ibid., 12.

national service better prepare the military for the next conflict and at the same time accomplish other national security objectives? These are issues addressed within this thesis.

Assumptions

There are several critical assumptions made in this thesis:

1. It is assumed that the current downsizing of the military will continue, at least until the end of the current Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle in FY 1997. This has very serious repercussions on reenlistment, accessions, and retention rates.

2. Personnel Reenlistment and Retention models are accurate. Forecasting models used by the Manpower and Personnel Policy Research Group, U.S. Army Research Institute, and the similar sister services' manpower models, are accurate (or at least have no systematic errors). Therefore, as the force gets smaller, these models can be used to successfully predict accessions and retentions in the military.

3. There will be no adverse morale factors that will distort these models as the military separates large numbers of career personnel.

4. Recruiting standards will tighten. The Services will retain their goal of not compromising on the

recruitment and retention of quality people. This is the number one goal, for instance, of both the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff. The Services will retain the current educational benefits (including the Montgomery G.I. Bill) and selective reenlistment bonus programs.

5. Any future national service program will be modeled on The National and Community Service Act of 1990 (the Act), an act signed in to law by President George Bush in November 1990. Of the approximately 60 bills introduced before Congress since 1973, this is the only one that was signed into law (PL 101-610). Given the amount of time, effort, compromise, and concomitant special political circumstances needed to make this Act a reality, no dissimilar national service bill could be successfully passed into law within the near future.

6. Some Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) operations appear transferrable to national service programs. HCA missions are an inherent part of Low Intensity Conflict operations and consist mainly of social and economic assistance. These operations are similar to those performed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps, among other groups. HCA can be performed by national service programs; whether they are performed by them depends more on policy and physical security concerns. This paper assumes that bureaucratic politics will not block these programs

from being transferred. Validity of the conclusions in this paper rests with the feasibility of dovetailing national service missions with military missions, given the existing political coalitions and self-interests.

Limitations

The major limitation with this thesis lies in the validity of the assumption that future national service programs will be modelled on The National and Community Service Act of 1990 (the Act). It was only through a special combination of factors, most importantly a sympathetic President, an uninterested military, a Congress magnanimous with its authorizations but stingy with its appropriations, and high teenage unemployment, that allowed the Act to be passed into law. Although it is highly unlikely that another national service law could be enacted, a dissimilar law would challenge the validity of the conclusions in this thesis.

A sizable change in current plans to downsize the military could limit the validity of the conclusions. If the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) dissolves and instability vastly increases in the old Soviet Union, then the military might stop downsizing or even increase its size. This would increase the military's need for accessions and place additional demands on the declining youth cohort. In that case, the increased competition for

manpower caused by national service would justifiably remove any rationale for military support for those programs.

On purely theoretical grounds alone, if national resources (money, manpower, etc.) can be used to fund a national service program without a military quid pro quo, the military should support it. In practice, military support for national service will be forthcoming only in return for some perceived, concrete benefit. That benefit will have an associated cost to the military. It is difficult to estimate the costs and benefits to the military of national service programs. Therefore, conclusions in this study about the usefulness of several national service programs to the military are based on military experiences from the 1930s and 1940s. Much of the supposed benefits and costs of military cooperation with civilian national service programs are speculative and are based on anecdotal evidence. Furthermore, conclusions in this study are limited by the quality of this circumstantial evidence and could be called in to question by a more detailed, empirical work on the costs of these cooperative arrangements.

The literature on national service is voluminous. Unfortunately, despite interest in national service, there are no large U.S. national service programs, past or present, to serve as an effective basis of comparison with a national draft program or the AVF. There are, or were, numerous small national service programs, including the

Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the Peace Corps, ACTION, the National Health Service Corps, and Department of Education Programs, but U.S. history offers no model of a truly national program. Therefore, there are no primary sources that deal directly with the issues addressed in this paper. Although that may limit the degree by which past experience may guide national service programs of the future, it does not detract from the relevance of the arguments in this paper.

Delimitations

America is not the only country to grapple with national service issues. Several countries use conscription or universal training in order to fill the ranks of their militaries. Some of these countries use national service programs as alternative forms of service for their conscientious objectors and as a means to employ conscripts that are excess to military requirements. Table 1 shows a partial list of these countries.

Although there are certain lessons to learn from foreign experiences, a delimitation of this paper is that its analysis is based on U.S. experiences. Foreign national service programs are country-unique and the costs and benefits of these programs are hard to apply to U.S. circumstances. Moreover, except for Germany, many of these programs are not well documented. Additionally, these

TABLE 1
SELECTED MILITARIES AND NATIONAL SERVICE

COUNTRY	TYPE OF MILITARY	USES NATIONAL SERVICE
France	Conscript	Yes
Germany	Conscript	Yes
Netherlands	Conscript	Yes
Portugal	Conscript	No
Israel	Universal Training	No
Switzerland	Universal Training	No
Britain	Volunteer	No
Canada	Volunteer	No
United States	Volunteer	No

Source: Richard Danzig and Peter Szanton, National Service: What Would It Mean? (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), 79 and 133.

programs are relatively small, including Germany's program, and do not offer a sufficient body of evidence to extrapolate to the U.S. system. As Western militaries and their conscription-driven national service programs shrink in response to a declining CIS threat, it is more difficult to extract useful information from these programs. For these reasons, this paper draws entirely from U.S. data.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Precious little thought has been spent analyzing whether a national service program could enhance military capabilities. The typical premise of most documented work is that the AVF and national service are mutually exclusive. National service is assumed to replace the AVF and so these subjects are often considered in isolation from each other. A survey of literature on national service reveals that the subject is most often analyzed from historical, social policy, economic, or military perspectives.

Historical Perspective

National service has a long history in the United States, primarily dating from the early 1930s. However, the subject has lost some of its popularity in the wake of the military's success in Operation Desert Shield/Storm and as a result of the budget agreement negotiated between the President and Congress in the fall of 1990. Most of the primary and secondary works of the past have dealt with a very popularized national service program called the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).

Although the CCC lasted from 1933-1942, the CCC was not a large program compared to the size of the eligible youth cohort that supplied manpower for the program. The CCC is thoroughly analyzed in the literature and its use as a model for military participation in a national service program is the subject of two theses. Brennan's MMAS thesis "Military's Peacetime Role (Implications of the Civilian Conservation Corps Experience)" concludes that the military's participation in the CCC benefited the economy and improved the military's preparedness to fight in World War II. Most importantly, he postulates a positive link between peacetime missions and military cooperation in national service.

Pike's doctoral thesis "A Comparative Analysis: Will the All-Volunteer Force or a Universal Military Training and Service Program Offer the Best Means of Assuring National Defense for the United States in the 1980s?" concludes that the U.S. has traded money for duty, honor, country. To remedy this problem he proposes a program of national service to ensure national security and develop a sense of responsibility in our youths. The linkage of enhanced security through national service is relevant to this thesis. Although his threat assessment is outdated, Pike provides some insight in to how national service promotes greater security for the country, hence, it helps the

military perform its basic function while fulfilling social goals.

Nanney and Gough's U.S. Manpower Mobilization for World War II, sponsored by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, recounts the nation's experience in trying to mobilize before World War II. The work is relevant because today's huge military drawdown is reminiscent of the drawdown following World War I, and there is no reason to suspect that the country has learned much from that prior experience. Using national service to supplement the AVF might prevent some of the mobilization problems the nation encountered in 1940.

An extremely useful work from the 1940s goes a long way to explain the heritage and necessity of national service. The 1947 report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, called A Program for National Security, is a surprisingly modern appeal for a universal service program to replace the conscription of World War II. The most useful aspects of the book revolve around the arguments given for the bureaucracy and civilian oversight necessary to run a national program of this scale. Also relevant to this thesis is the Commission's argument that universal service is a benefit to the military as well as to the volunteers and the country.

The issue of universal military training dates back to the citizen-soldier debates of the 1770s, starting with

General George Washington. Much has been written on this subject. Foster's The Strategic Dimension of Military Manpower and The National Defense University's The Anthropo Factor in Warfare: Conscripts, Volunteers, and Reserves provide excellent background for understanding the nature of citizen-soldiers and the dialectic Active/Reserve Component system. These works are important to the thesis because they provide historical insights into how national service fits in with Reserve functions. These works draw a line of demarcation between national service and reserve responsibilities; this questions the feasibility of transferring missions between the two of them.

Social Perspective

In 1910, William James, in an essay entitled "The Moral Equivalent Of War," advocated national service as a way to toughen young men without bloodshed and channel their atavistic energies into socially productive projects. He believed that the result would unify society. The literature on national service is replete with arguments to employ the youth of our society in projects that fulfill unmet social needs and impart on the volunteers a sense of civic responsibility.

The majority of the works written about national service revolve around the theme that the country needs a program that encourages public service and meets the needs

of youths. That is exactly the perspective taken in Sherraden and Eberly's National Service: Social, Economic and Military Impacts. This is a thorough, though biased, treatment of national service. The book discusses the history and social utility of universal service and devotes a good deal of space justifying national social needs and employment benefits of such a program. The most useful aspect of this book is the authors' attempt to estimate the number of unfilled jobs/needs that could be serviced by a national service program. A cross-reference with future military missions provides a useful starting point for analyzing how the military might use national service to its advantage.

A key objective of this thesis is to analyze which, if any, national service program has anything to offer the military and detail what action the military should take in response to it. Some useful references for determining which national service programs are both feasible and attractive to the military are the transcripts of the proceedings of the national service bills that were debated in both Houses of Congress in 1990. The two main bills were S.1430, The National and Community Service Act, and H.R. 4330, The National Service Act. These two bills were eventually combined together and became The National and Community Service Act of 1990.

The main emphasis in these hearings is on the social impact of national service. Most of the testimony revolves around school-related programs, conservation efforts, and the desirability of finding useful, character-building work for the youths of America. There is no analysis of, nor testimony on, possible defense-related issues. These proceedings represent the most important viewpoints in the country about national service and provide the basis for a politically defensible national service program.

Danzig and Szanton take a different approach to analyzing national service programs in their National Service: What Would It Mean?. They propose four different, very specific types of national service plans and analyze the costs and benefits of each program. Rather than generalize on abstract programs, they concentrate on detailed programs and lay out the repercussions of these programs to the nation, the military, and the youths themselves. They exert a good deal of effort determining the social needs of the country and analyzing how these needs may be met through national service programs. Their thirteen "judgments" about national service attempt to be objective and non-committal about the issue. The book attempts to allow the reader to judge for himself the efficacy of national service. Despite their efforts not to use persuasion as a rhetorical tool, they cast enough doubt about the value of national service as to make the whole

idea suspect; this is extremely relevant to any conclusion that the military can benefit from national service.

Military Perspective

Many think-tanks and special interest groups have written books and position papers expressing their views on the nature of a voluntary military. The philosophical merits of national service will not be debated here, instead, the intent is to determine whether national service might be of some use to the military and has any chance of being initiated at all. Treatises such as Binkin's America's Volunteer Military: Progress and Prospects, Goodpaster's Toward a Consensus on Military Service, and Conaty's Is National Service Really Feasible?, provide useful information about the character of volunteerism and military service and thus provide useful starting points for devising a militarily-supportable national service program.

Economic Perspective

The government has always been involved in reviewing the AVF that it created in 1973. Several congressional agencies, executive commissions, and government-sponsored organizations have taken critical looks at both the AVF and national service. The economics behind the AVF have been extensively covered by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Within five years after establishing the AVF, CBO looked at National Service Programs and Their Effects on

Military Manpower and Civilian Youth Programs. This report downplays the affects of national service on military recruitment but does suggest some problems with labor unions. This was one of many reports that looked askance at the political economy of the AVF. CBO produced a series of reports in 1980 analyzing the military, including Costs of Manning the Active-Duty Military, Costs of the National Service Act, and Costs of the National Service Act (H.R. 2206): A Technical Analysis. These reports followed the dismal year of 1979 which witnessed the nadir of the AVF.

Congress became very concerned about the AVF in the early 1980s. Poor recruiting, below average retention, and the botched Iranian hostage rescue attempt all triggered a reevaluation of the AVF. The resulting CBO reports are useful in understanding the fragility of a voluntary system and aid in determining the true costs of using market principles to attract enlistees. The most interesting finding is how youth will respond to educational and monetary benefits that are offered as inducements to join the service. How can a national service program instill civic pride and volunteerism when the main motive for joining the program is overtly the compensation? The more important question that these studies highlight is critical to acceptance of a national service program: why has a market economy failed to provide sufficient incentive to people to perform the jobs planned for in a national service

program? If the market place will not pay for these jobs to be done, why should the government pay for these services?

Throughout the 1980s, CBO continued to revise its analysis of the AVF and concentrated its attention on compensation. A series of reports compared the military with the civilian sector in order to arrive at some understanding of fair/equal pay for military personnel. These reports included Improving Military Educational Benefits: Effects on Costs, Recruiting, and Retention and Quality Soldiers: Costs of Manning the Active Army. The United States General Accounting Office was also involved in the analysis and produced Military Compensation: Comparisons With Civilian Compensation and Related Issues and Military Compensation: Key Concepts and Issues. These works are important for analyzing the inducements necessary for initiating a large scale national service program and point out the economic difficulties of offering a program that might compete directly with the compensation offered by the military. The meager stipends and educational benefits of volunteer programs in the past may not be able to handle the military competition. The bottom line with all of these congressionally-mandated reports is that the alternatives to the AVF are expensive and will likely interfere with military recruiting efforts. This conclusion is relevant to any recommendation in this thesis that favors military support for national service programs.

An outstanding article on the economic effects of national service programs is found in Evers' National Service: Pro and Con. The article by Walter Y. Oi, "National Service: Who Bears the Costs and Who Reaps the Gains?," goes a long way in detailing the high budgetary costs of a voluntary national service program and cleverly demonstrates that the cost per volunteer exceeds the mean earnings of high school graduates. He challenges the value of unskilled labor thrown in to social service jobs and refutes the implicit distrust of free market forces that a national service program implies.

There are no major gaps in the literature concerning the doctrinal and derived military missions nor the proposed missions to be filled by national service. Likewise, there is sufficient historical testimony in the records of the Congress to ascertain which types of national service programs stand the best chance of enactment.

The works listed above develop the theme that national service and the AVF may have something to offer each other, however, national service will be expensive and of limited value. None of these works summarily dismisses national service out-of-hand; all of them recognize the social value of volunteer service. These works are useful in developing ideas about how national service might be considered as an adjunct, instead of an alternative, to the AVF.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

It takes quite a bit of conjecture in order to determine how national service might or might not supplement the AVF. For one, it is sometimes hard to predict future military roles and missions. Additionally, it is difficult to determine who would be in control of the program. In fact, linking national service to the military might itself destroy the political coalition that currently supports national service. The key to political success for the program lies in its utility to its participants, the military, the economy, and to active, vocal registered voters.

The value of national service is not as ethereal as it might appear at first glance. National service is not a new phenomena, although the country has never had a comprehensive national program. There are numerous, smaller national service programs currently in existence that can be used as models to assess the effectiveness of national service programs on achieving national objectives. That will provide a starting point from which to extrapolate feasible support of the AVF.

The structure of the analysis in this thesis revolves around an assessment matrix. The analysis begins by looking at current national security strategy and then deducing future peacetime and wartime missions for the AVF. These missions are cross-referenced in the matrix with feasible national service programs, including existing programs, historical programs, and politically-relevant recommended programs. The function and composition of these programs are explained and then each program is evaluated vis-a-vis how well it will contribute, if at all, to complementing the AVF. In the end, the utility of a national service program to the military and to the country is based on the following criteria:

Relevancy. Does the program focus on a problem which might be addressed by the AVF? Is the country better served by having civilians perform the mission, in terms of output, costs, political sensibilities, or some other measure? Is the mission accomplished in an efficient, consistent manner and not at excessive costs?

Reliability. Is the program at "echelons above reality" or can it be executed within existing legislative, political, economic, and legal constraints? If not, is it feasible to make the necessary adjustments? Is it likely the military will support the national service program if the evidence seems compelling? Is there a consistent, stable objective that civilian work can accomplish?

Sufficiency. Will a national service program accomplish the mission or require AVF backup anyway?

Timeliness. Can a national service program be instituted, or refocused (if it already exists), within a reasonable time or does it require a long lead time. Is there a small window of opportunity within which conditions are currently favorable; is it likely that the nature of the national service debate will materially change in the near future?

The military must look at all the costs and benefits of a national service program and determine whether it is in its interest to support such a program.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Although a smaller military will solve many of the AVF's prior problems, it does not follow that the military should be indifferent, let alone hostile, toward national service. However, a program of national service may not help the military but could hinder future recruiting and retention efforts. To analyze the impact of national service on the AVF requires the military to first determine its future requirements. Once it knows what it needs, the military can then judge the value of various national service programs in fulfilling those needs. Military needs are deduced from future military missions and requirements and from historical events.

Military Mission Development

In August of 1990, President Bush articulated a new defense strategy for the U.S. which recognized the dramatic changes that have occurred in the old Soviet Union over the last two years. In essence, he indicated that defense planning has shifted from an emphasis on global war with the Soviets to an orientation on regional conflict and peacetime engagement.

Regional conflict is fraught with many disturbing trends. The new strategy recognizes a reemergence of dangerous trends in areas that were ignored during the U.S. preoccupation with Cold War realities. These trends affect all the levels of warfare: low, middle, and high intensity, but they tend to concentrate in the low intensity range. Although critics charge that the military is simply searching for new missions to keep defense budgets high, these revitalized threats reflect a shift in Defense Department emphasis and an awareness of new, growing dangers.

Trends that are shaping the global security system are shown in Table 2. Trends in Group A will likely involve hostilities that will necessitate the use of military force. Trends in Group B may also involve the employment of the U.S. military but may not require any use of force. The trends in Group B reflect an important change in the emphasis of military power and how it is applied to achieve security.

What should be most alarming to military strategists is that many of these trends are not easily countered by conventional uses of the military. In the future, a greater share of military effort will be directed toward combatting Group B trends rather than Group A trends. This is why peacetime engagement has become so important; the military

will have to rely more on HCA skills than warfighting skills to counter these threats to national security.

TABLE 2
TRENDS SHAPING THE GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Group A

- Increased threat from international drug trade.
- Rising number of insurgencies.
- Global rise in terrorism.
- Continued existence of regional troublemakers (e.g. Hussein, Kadafi).
- Rise in ethnic violence.

Group B

- Collapse of the Second World's economy.
- Third World overpopulation.
- Third World pollution.
- Growth in the gap between rich and poor countries.
- Rise in religious fundamentalism.
- Movements of large refugee populations.

In his 1991 speech "In Defense of Defense," President Bush stated that the U.S. needs a defense policy that adapts to change without

neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy -- a policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to ... our interests and ideals in today's world.¹

Peacetime engagement is a strategy that seeks to counteract instability that threatens to grow in the world by

¹George Bush, quoted in United States Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense: Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1991), 132.

mitigating violence and promoting nation-building. One way to do this is through use of military forces. These forces can be selectively applied to counter violence that results from insurgencies, terrorism, and drug trafficking, all of which fall in to category A threats.

Fortunately, the military has put a priority on creating Special Operations Forces (SOF) that can perform this subset of peacetime engagement. Recently, more emphasis has been placed on Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), which in the past has generally included the types of threats that accompany the trends in Group A above. For the LIC environment the military has fielded Light-Infantry forces and military packages tailored for assisting countries involved in combatting the drug trade. The U.S. has also demonstrated a willingness to use these forces. Operations have occurred in such diverse places as Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Libya, Peru, Columbia, and Honduras, among others.

Peacetime engagement also includes security assistance for foreign internal defense (FID). FID includes training host nation military units and police assistance programs, but it also includes more benign assistance. Peacetime engagement also includes using

various instruments of national power ... to promote private enterprise and market-oriented economic growth, democracy, and political reform, justice and respect for human rights, and an environment conducive to representative government.²

All of these are humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) activities. This side of peacetime engagement is gaining in prominence and the reason seems clear: the rising threats implicit in Group B trends do not easily lend themselves to overt military intervention. The military must use HCA to engage Group B threats.

The logical questions to ask are why use the military for HCA and what means does the military have to address these problems? These are not typical 'military' tasks and their solutions do not revolve around the application of force. Yet these trends cannot be divorced from military concerns because they can indirectly affect the security of the country. Nation-assistance operations are an essential ingredient in ensuring the legitimacy of the host nation government and are a prerequisite for stable economic and social functioning. Failure to consider HCA is inherently destabilizing in many Third World countries. As overt military actions fade from public favor and become less important as an instrument of national power, the humanitarian and civic assistance tools of the military gain in importance.

²Ibid., 6.

Defense Priorities

To get some idea of how the military intends to counter the trends in Table 2, look at how the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has altered defense priorities. For the 1990s the SECDEF has established the following defense priorities:

1. Credible Deterrent Forces
2. High Quality Force
3. Alliance Structures
4. Arms Control
5. Nonproliferation and Technology Security
6. Research and Development
7. Sustaining Intelligence Capabilities
8. Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and Peacetime Engagement
9. Fight Against Drugs

Most of these priorities are consistent with lists from previous years. Unfortunately, most of these have little direct effect on the trends in Group B.

Credible deterrent forces and a high-quality force are priorities that allow us to fulfill the strategic missions of providing power projection, forward presence, reinforcing and contingency forces, and maintaining nuclear deterrence. These priorities are more important for conventional concerns in the high and mid-intensity levels of conflict. They address none of the issues found in Group B trends.

The same can be said of Arms Control. It has received a lot of attention because of the Central Forces Europe (CFE) arms reduction talks and the political

disintegration of the Soviet Union, but offers no indication of how to counter Group B trends. The priorities placed on Nonproliferation, Technology Security, and Research and Development also offer no assistance.

Sustaining Intelligence Capabilities has maintained its importance in view of some spectacular intelligence failures in Operations Just Cause (Panama) and Desert Storm (Iraq) and will play a significant role at all levels of warfare. But the two remaining priorities hint at changes in missions.

The biggest changes in priorities over the last two years have been in LIC and Peacetime Engagement and the Fight Against Drugs. To a lesser degree, changes in Alliance Structures (especially in our treatment of members of the old WARSAW Pact) and Arms Control. These changes in defense priorities by the National Command Authority are reflected in revised military missions.

These priorities are considered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his Joint Strategy Review and are translated into missions which are ultimately sent to the warfighting commanders and the services in the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). The missions in the latest NMSD reflect these shifts in Defense priorities. With the emphasis in missions away from the 'global war' side of the conflict spectrum, missions now lie much closer to the 'peacetime contingencies' side of the scale.

Peacetime contingency missions can be categorized as follows:

- Support civil authorities by participating in natural and environmental disaster relief, emergency assistance, quelling civil disorder, and the interdiction of illicit drugs.

- Support Allied and Friendly nations through peacekeeping, nation building assistance, and security assistance.

- Develop the capacity to reconstitute additional forces necessary to confront potential adversaries, should the need arise.

- Conduct shows of force and demonstrations, rescue and recovery operations, strikes and raids, and unconventional warfare.

Peacetime contingency operations can directly counter both Group A and B trends. The interdiction of illicit drugs, strikes and raids, and unconventional warfare can obviously be used to counter increased threats from the international drug trade. Shows of force and demonstrations, strikes and raids, and unconventional warfare will likewise help deal with the rising number of insurgencies, the rise in terrorism, and the continued existence of regional troublemakers. U.S. security assistance programs also aid in countering all of these trends. Therefore, it is clear to see how peacetime

contingency operations affect the perilous trends in Group A. But what about Group B trends?

The growth in importance of peacetime contingencies in defense priorities reflects a much expanded role for the military. The military's mission has always been to deter war, and if that fails, destroy the enemy's force and compel him to obey U.S. demands. But the skills and resources needed to accomplish that core mission are different from those required for peacetime contingencies. Peacetime contingencies require the use of innovative strategies that support representative government and promote economic development. The main impact of the military in peacetime contingency operations is to act as a stabilizing force for the supported agency.

In peacetime contingencies the military cooperates with civilian governments and private organizations to handle delicate situations. It provides technical and organizational expertise to the foreign elements. Military civil affairs, medical, environmental hazard, finance, and police personnel provide the coordination and balance that is needed at critical times to stabilize a government or a crisis. In that way, the military indirectly counters Group B trends: it provides economic assistance and expertise to a faltering economy, helps curb overpopulation or fights an outbreak of disease through medical assistance, cleans up environmental disasters, and gives a country the expertise

to fight economic inequity and imbalances. The military can also use police forces to quell religious and ethnic violence.

Although the military has certainly performed peacetime contingency missions in the past (these were called stability operations) that supported wartime missions, these were incidental, ancillary missions and were not priority missions. The real change today is that peacetime contingencies are now a major mission in and of themselves for the military.

These missions cover the gamut from direct military intervention to peacemaking. Table 3 summarizes these missions.

TABLE 3
MILITARY PEACETIME CONTINGENCY MISSIONS

- Disaster relief
- Emergency assistance
- Quelling civil disorder
- Drug interdiction
- Peacekeeping
- Nation building
- Security assistance
- Reconstitute forces
- Shows of force and demonstrations
- Rescue and recovery
- Strikes and raids
- Unconventional warfare

Source: United States Army, FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), 5-1.

Most importantly, these missions complement political and social initiatives. Although civilians in a national service program will not conduct shows of force and demonstrations, rescue and recovery operations, strikes and raids, and unconventional warfare, it is in the arena of the military's peacetime contingency missions that national service programs can best compete. It is precisely because of the political sensitivity and social nature of these operations that a national service program might offer the military some assistance.

National Service

The term "national service" encompasses several perspectives through which to view its value to the country and hence determine its purpose. Supporters justify its value as an attempt to "rectify a perceived lack of community involvement and civic awareness, ... while at the same time offering a way to cope with rising education and housing costs."³ Others value it as a way to provide needed services to communities that the marketplace refuses to provide. It is hard to characterize the nature of the national service debate. On the one hand, opposing national service are:

³"National Service," Congressional Digest 89 (May 1990): 131.

Classical liberals (or libertarians) and those conservatives who emphasize individual rights, constitutional protections, and free market economics. Those welfare liberals who emphasize individual rights and constitutional protections. Favoring national service are those conservatives and liberals who emphasize civic virtue, citizenship, and serving the political community as the common duty and purpose of all in the society.⁴

No single political party nor one side of the political spectrum has sole possession of the issue. Likewise, programs proposed by each supporter differ. One thing is clear: the woes of the military are no longer the primary justification for calls to national service. Although most supporters of national service cite both civic and military reasons as justification for national service, the overwhelming reasons for these programs are rooted in civil concerns.

Decoupling National Service and the AVF

In the past, the link between national service and the military was seen as inseparable. This was recognized long ago by the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training in 1947. The Commission debated whether a program

of universal training could be supported solely on the basis of its possible contribution to the nation's health, education, and spiritual development. It has been our judgment that ... [it could not]. The only basis on which universal training should be

⁴Evers, xix.

accepted ... is a demonstration that it is needed to insure our safety in a world ... not yet secure.⁵

But that is no longer the prevailing view about national service. The Act was signed into law without debate nor consideration of potential impact on national security concerns. Dramatic world events over the past two years have challenged U.S. security assumptions and have helped separate national service from security concerns.

Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have altered the threat against our country. The Soviet Union itself ceased to exist in 1991 and in its place its member republics have been granted independence and have formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Since the failed Soviet Coup in 1991, the republics have promised democratic reforms and have taken steps to transition to market economies. The Warsaw Pact has been dissolved, the two Germanies have united, and Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Additionally, the U.S. and CIS (nee: Soviet Union) signed a Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty that has resulted in conventional forces reductions that have visibly lowered the strategic threat against NATO. The "threat of a U.S.-Soviet conflict is

⁵Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, A Program for National Security (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 2.

lower than at any time since the end of World War II."⁶ Global tensions have clearly eased so there is less need to tie national service together with security demands.

Linkage between the AVF and national service has been severed for other reasons besides the improvement in the security environment. Continuing improvements in the quality and performance of the AVF itself during the 1980s have contributed to this decoupling.

The AVF is thriving and the prognosis is good. In fiscal year 1990, the services exceeded their retention objectives in all categories. Recruiting goals for fiscal year 1991 were at 100 percent fill, despite the fact that the U.S. faced a shooting war. The quality of the force is at an all-time high. For instance, 98 percent of Army accessions in fiscal year 1991 had high school diplomas; 75 percent scored in the upper half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), and less than one percent were in test score Category IV (Cat 4, the lowest level suitable for military service), compared with 57 percent Cat 4 in 1980.⁷ These favorable trends are highlighted in Tables 4 and 5.

⁶George H. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1991), 5.

⁷Jack C. Wheeler, "In Recruiting, Quality Is All," ARMY 41 (September 1991): 36.

TABLE 4
DoD ACTIVE NON-PRIOR SERVICE
ACCESSION SUCCESSES
(percentages are rounded)

Year(s)	Percent of Accession Goals Met	Percent of High School Graduates in the Force	Percent of Force Mental Category IV
Draft Era:			
1960-1964	100.0	64.0	14.0
1965-1969	100.0	74.0	21.0
1970-1973	100.0	70.0	22.0
AVF Era:			
1974	100.0	66.0	10.0
1975	100.7	66.0	6.0
1976	100.6	69.0	5.0
1977	98.3	69.5	32.0
1978	98.0	77.0	26.0
1979	90.3	73.0	34.0
1980	100.2	67.5	35.0
1981	100.6	81.0	22.0
1982	101.0	86.0	15.0
1983	100.5	91.5	10.0
1984	101.0	93.5	9.0
1985	100.0	93.0	6.5
1986	100.0	91.0	4.0
1987	100.0	93.0	4.0
1988	100.0	93.0	4.0
1989	100.0	90.0	7.0
1990	100.0	95.0	3.0
1991	100.0	98.0	2.0

Sources: United States General Accounting Office, Military Compensation, NSIAD-86-131BR, 1986, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 23-25; Martin Binkin, America's Volunteer Military: Progress and Prospects, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1979, 8; and United States Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense: Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1991, 40.

TABLE 5
ACTIVE ARMY ACCESSIONS,
MENTAL CATEGORIES AND HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMAS

AFQT Mental Category	AFQT Percentile Ranking	Level of Trainability Definition	Youth Population	Army Recruits FY80 FY86 FY91		
I,II,IIIA	50-99	Average to Superior	50%	26%	63%	75%
IIIB	31-49	Average	19%	22%	33%	24%
IV	10-30	Marginal	21%	52%	4%	1%
V	0-9	Unqualified	10%	0%	0%	0%
HS Diplomas			74%	54%	91%	98%

Source: Francis S. Conaty, Special Report: Is National Service Really Feasible, Association of the United States Army (AUSA), 1987, 21; and Jack C. Wheeler, "In Recruiting, Quality Is All," Army 41, no. 9 (September 1991), 36.

The important implication of these trends is that national service can do little to raise the quality of military accessions. Aside from having college graduates volunteer for military service (an unlikely repercussion of national service), there is little room for improvement in recruit initial-entry standards. The military has little reason to suspect that its overall manpower quality will improve as a result of a popular national service program.

The AVF is already recruiting people who are smarter and better educated than U.S. society as a whole. The Services are committed to pursuing quality enlistees and have vowed to tighten, not lower, their recruiting standards. Fortunately, even demographic trends will work in favor of the Services. The decline in the rate of


anticipated accessions for the next decade exceeds the rate of decline of the youth cohort. Ceteris paribus, the military will have to recruit a smaller percentage of the eligible youth cohort. These trends are evident in Figure 2 which shows DoD accessions over the next five years as a percentage of eighteen-year-olds in the country. Recall from Figure 1 that the "demographic squeeze" occurs most severely from 1992 to 1994.

National Service Missions

It would seem clear that the AVF no longer needs an alternative program to "solve its problems." Neither demographics, the economy, budget cuts, nor security concerns are sufficiently troublesome to endanger the health of the AVF. Likewise, it is doubtful that national service would solve the major ancillary problem that has hounded the AVF, namely, its disproportionate minority representation. This is because most national service programs cater to unemployed youths which tend to be overrepresented by minorities. But national service programs offer some hope of performing some peacetime contingency missions that the AVF is now confronting. The AVF must consider how specific national service missions could further the attainment of AVF objectives.

National service has enjoyed remarkable popular support over the years, however, the big problem with

Figure 2
DoD Accessions and Eighteen-Year-Olds



defining a specific program is agreeing on its content. Milton Friedman, an economist and member of the Gates Commission (which help start the AVF in 1973), wryly noted that each supporter of national service

... has a different plan in mind. And none of them likes the other fellow's plan. There is .8. very little support for any particular program.⁸

There are countless potential national service programs. Nonetheless, most of the prominent national service programs all have similar missions and organizational structures. The missions of most national service programs are to instill in youth a sense of civic pride, offer them productive work with tangible community benefits, and give them a sense of accomplishment. Table 6 shows a list of potential needs that supporters of national service would like to see addressed.

TABLE 6

UNMET SOCIAL NEEDS IN THE UNITED STATES

Prepare reading material for the blind
Care for children, elderly, and the homeless
Work on conservation and cleanup projects
Help drug abusers and those with AIDS
Work in libraries, prisons, and mental institutions
Operate paratransit vehicles for the handicapped
Work as teacher's aides

Source: Williamson M. Evers, ed., National Service: Pro and Con (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), xxiv.

⁸Martin Anderson, The Military Draft (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1982), 181.

Interestingly, military and national security needs are not specifically addressed in most national service proposals today. Most supporters of national service attempt to quantify only the social needs for youth labor. Table 7 shows a typical accounting of potential national service assignments.

TABLE 7
VOLUNTEER WORK NEEDED TO BE DONE

<u>Work Category</u>	<u>Potential Jobs Available (in 000s)</u>
Education	1,200
Health	750
Child Care	820
Environment	165
Miscellaneous Services	
Justice	250
Libraries/museums	200
All Other	<u>100</u>
Total	3,484

Source: Richard Danzig and Peter Szanton, National Service: What Would It Mean?, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986, 41.

The chief characteristics of existing and proposed national service programs are that they must be voluntary, not 'bust the budget', not duplicate existing programs, and provide meaningful work to the participants.⁹ In this era

⁹Congressional Digest 89, 131-133.

of record government deficits and budget cuts, an expensive national service program will not generate any political support unless a bill-payer can be found. Programs must be presented as an investment in our youth and as a cost-effective way of performing needed services. The work must provide opportunities for learning basic and life skills, education, training, and provide support. All other characteristics appear to be negotiable. This leaves open a wide range of possible programs.

National Service Structure

The organizational structure of national service programs will likely differ based on the type of program, although many of them will have similar features. A typical national service program asks that all youths, male and female, voluntarily give one year of service to their country, with extensions possible. All youths, whether or not they have any mental or physical disabilities, will be eligible for the program. Conditions for acceptance into the military remain unchanged. The current AVF is left intact because all national service programs are completely separate from the military.

How a person volunteers for national service would be different from past proposals. Proponents of national service in World War II favored a system "under which a government agency would have the power to assign citizens to

jobs, while the Selective Service System alone would decide who should enter the armed forces."¹⁰ In most of the proposed programs today, youths will register to serve on their 18th birthday, or the completion of secondary school, whichever is later (no national service program encourages youths to drop-out of high-school early). Registration will occur at a regional placement center managed by civilians.

Having regional placement centers managed by civilians is a major structural change in national service programs. At registration, youths will be counselled by civilians on the job options available to them in the civilian sector. The options could involve a myriad of jobs or some form of training, depending on the type of service preferred. Placement centers will determine which projects are available, certify work to be done by the volunteers, and provide post-service career counselling to assist in job placement. This may partly account for the military's reluctance to support national service. If the idea of national service becomes popular, the military will be a residual claimant for the volunteer's services once the placement centers have counselled the youth. This will place military recruiting efforts at a disadvantage.


¹⁰James S. Nanney and Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Manpower Mobilization for World War II (U.S. Army Center of Military History, September 1982), 126.

Roles of the centers are important, in that volunteer positions will be certified as acceptable positions by the placement centers, a decentralized decision. Securing a particular job will be left up to the youths with the employer having the discretion to hire and fire personnel. Youths will be able to begin work immediately in job openings certified as acceptable by the center. The youths could also use a delayed-entry program similar to that currently used by the military. All volunteers will receive the same benefits, advantages, privileges, and safeguards. The program will be administered at the local level through grants funded by the federal government. Private sector employers must agree to provide a portion of the salary/stipend for workers and provide all necessary training.

The agency responsible for the placement centers has already been established by law: The Commission on National and Community Service (the Commission). This Commission was created by PL 101-610, The National and Community Service Act of 1990, and it is a quasi-public corporation. The Commission is comprised of a Board of Directors consisting of 21 members that are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. The Board must be balanced according to race, ethnicity, age, and gender. The composition of the Board is shown in Figure 3.

FIGURE 3

THE COMMISSION ON NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE



Not more than 11 members can come from the same political party. Seven members of the Board are appointed from those nominated by the Speaker of the House and seven are appointed from those nominated by the majority leader of the Senate. Each member serves for two years, except the initial members serve for one year. The Board meets three

times per year. The duties of the Board are to

1. Advise the President and the Congress on national service issues,

2. Design, administer and disseminate information on programs,

3. Consult with Federal agencies,

4. Delegate authority to administer programs,

5. Provide for training and technical assistance to program agencies,

6. Evaluate programs,

7. Coordinate with DoD in evaluating the effect of the national service demonstration program on the recruitment efforts of the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces, and

8. Carry out other activities determined appropriate by the Secretary.¹¹

The duties of the Commission are broad-based because it is the umbrella-type organization for all current domestic volunteer programs. To facilitate control and avoid micromanagement, Congress has designed the Commission similar to the current-day Peace Corps. It is empowered to consult with federal agencies, including DoD, but is only required to coordinate with DoD on matters pertaining to recruitment. A look at Figure 3 shows that DoD has no

¹¹United States Code, Public Law 101-610, 3168.


institutional role in affecting actions taken by the Commission, not even in an ex-officio capacity. Although military members could be appointed as individuals to the Commission, DoD has no direct input into the decision-making process of the Commission. This is strange considering the fact that national service programs will compete with DoD for the same talent pool.

The regional structure of the program is shown in Figure 4. The significance of this structure should not go unnoticed. The clearinghouses are not designated as State nor federal agencies. These entities are chartered to administer a national service program through public and private nonprofit agencies, not departments of the state or federal government. The implication of this structure is that any expansion of existing national service programs that involve DoD participation would be supervised by these agencies and not DoD. Any change to this would require additional legislation. This would limit the amount of influence that the military would have on its participation.

The Executive Director of the Board is the coordinator of youth policies and programs. He is appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. He reports directly to the President. Contrast this with the administration of the CCC in the 1930s which was headed by the Department of Labor (although the Army actually did most of the administration and organizational work). The

FIGURE 4

REGIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL SERVICE PROGRAM



Commission can create ad hoc committees to assist in the administration of the program.

The national service structure authorized by the Act will very likely be the same one used by any national service program. A major benefit is that it is already in public law, so little is needed to activate the structure. Major drawbacks, from the military's perspective, is it allows DoD no direct way to influence program initiatives and policy decisions. In fact, DoD is essentially left out of the entire process.

National Service Program Initiatives

It is politically impractical and economically unrealistic to propose national service programs not specifically authorized by the Act. Given the difficulties overcome to pass this legislation and budget constraints that inhibit execution, the only national service programs that can be considered "legitimate" are ones that are allowable under this legislation. Even with that limitation in mind, the myriad number of programs possible under the Act are hardly a major restriction.

All national service program initiatives under the Act provide job, education, and training opportunities. None of them are welfare programs per se. In order to understand what the Act does, one must understand its purpose, to wit, the stated purpose of the Act is to:

1. Renew the ethic of civic responsibility in the youth of America,
2. Ask citizens to give service to the country,
3. Engage youths in service that benefits the country and improves their literacy and job skills,
4. Enable youths to serve by removing barriers to service,
5. Build on the existing organizational framework of Federal, State, and local programs and agencies to expand full-time and part-time service opportunities for all citizens,

6. Involve participants in activities that would not otherwise be performed by employed workers, and

7. Generate additional service hours each year to help meet human, educational, environmental, and public safety needs, particularly those relating to poverty.¹²

The programs offered in the Act create jobs that do not compete, where possible, with existing jobs in the private sector. This implies that the exact categories of jobs eligible for the program are limited by the Act. It is important to note that the Act does not exclude, as part of its purpose, cooperation with the military to meet human, educational, environmental, and public safety needs. The military does in fact meet these needs as part of its peacetime contingencies missions.

The Act specifically divides national service programs into six sub-categories. These classifications of national service programs either expand existing federal, state, and local programs or propose entirely new programs. These classifications include all politically feasible national service programs that can be started. These classifications are:

1. School-Aged Service Programs.

2. The American Conservation and Youth Service Corps Act of 1990.

¹²Ibid., 3129.

3. National and Community Service Act.
4. Governors' Innovative Service Programs.
5. Peace Corps and ACTION.
6. Other Volunteer Programs.

The positions available and work involved in these various programs are certainly worthwhile and fill pressing social needs. However, that does not imply that the military will benefit from such work. Table 8 lists these potential national service programs and matches them with peacetime contingency missions that these programs could address. The table shows programs that exist now, or would likely exist, under a comprehensive national service program authorized under the Act.

A comparison of Tables 3 and 8 shows that some of the peacetime contingency missions cannot be matched with national service programs. These missions, which include peacekeeping, quelling civil disorder, shows of force and demonstrations, rescue and recovery operations, strikes and raids, and unconventional warfare, are inherently violent and have no business in a national service program. No national service program will purposely place noncombatants in harm's way. Although these military missions might benefit in some small way from national service, the social costs of endangering noncombatants far outweigh any potential gains. That reduces the potential peacetime

TABLE 8
NATIONAL SERVICE PROGRAMS vs.
PEACETIME CONTINGENCY MISSIONS

National Service Program	Potential Peacetime Contingency Mission Filled
School-Aged Service Programs	None*
The American Conservation and Youth Service Corps Act of 1990	Disaster relief Emergency assistance Nation assistance Reconstitute forces
National and Community Service Act Programs	Reconstitute forces
Governors' Innovative Service Programs.	None*
Peace Corps and ACTION	Disaster relief Emergency assistance Security assistance Nation assistance
Other Volunteer Programs (day care, education, health, housing, etc.)	None*

* This national service program cannot perform any of the peacetime contingency missions.

contingency missions that can be performed by national service to six missions: disaster relief, emergency assistance, drug interdiction, nation assistance, security assistance, and reconstitute forces.

There is little these national service programs could contribute to other defense priorities outside of peacetime

contingencies. These priorities (discussed in the beginning of Chapter 4), such as credible deterrent forces, alliance structures, arms control, high quality force, etc., are not within the purview of national service programs. National service can support the missions deduced from those priorities, but only in a backhanded fashion. For example, institutionalizing national service could raise the consciousness of youths to volunteer, perhaps increase their patriotism, and generally improve their personal discipline; all of these measures would help the military. This indirect assistance to the military is difficult to measure and even harder to prove. In essence, national service will directly help the military only in its peacetime contingency missions.

The linkages between national service programs and peacetime contingencies are evaluated in the next section of this paper.

Provisions of the Act

Many provisions of the Act will not benefit the military in any demonstrable way. Each national service program shown in Table 8 addresses a separate segment of unfulfilled societal needs, consequently, each has a decidedly different applicability for benefitting the military. For example, some of the programs limit participation and some are of insufficient scope or

definition (such as the Governors' Innovative Service Programs) to provide any aid to the military.

In some cases, viable national service programs have a more ethereal value to the military rather than anything concrete. On the surface, school-based programs appear to offer nothing tangible to the military. But at high overall levels of youth participation, the redeeming value of these programs becomes more evident. If the country eventually reaches the point where most youths expect to perform voluntary service following high-school, then this could raise the quality of military accessions. The rationale for this is that as the number of all volunteers increase, more ex-college-bound students and more "upper class" youths will apply for military service.

The efficacy to the military of implementing one of the national service programs listed in Table 8 is evaluated according to the criteria discussed in Chapter 3. Each program will be judged on its relevancy, reliability, sufficiency, and timeliness.

School-Aged Service Programs

School-Aged Service Programs integrate high-school and university students into national service programs. There are already numerous service activities for high-school and college students. These programs are highly decentralized and most were created on an ad hoc basis by

local school systems. School-Aged Service Programs simply expand existing programs to school systems nationwide. This category of national service is composed of two separate programs.

The first program is the Serve-America Program, also known as The Community Service, Schools, and Service-Learning Act of 1990. This program works under the auspices of the Department of Education to integrate service-learning into academic curricula of secondary schools. The Commission provides grants to the Serve-America Program through the Department of Education to spend through schools, colleges, and local agencies to fund service jobs for young people for which they receive academic credit.

The second program is the Higher Education Innovative Projects for Community Service Program. This portion of the Act supports innovative projects to encourage college students to participate in community service activities. It attempts to integrate community service into academic curricula so that students can receive academic credit for their volunteer work. Participants must volunteer in the areas of human, educational, environmental or public safety service.

Schools are targeted by national service programs because that is where one finds most of the youth of America. Schools are the last national acculturation institutions in America, therefore, they are a logical place

to start when initiating programs that seek to engender civic responsibility. Moreover, schools are attuned to the needs of the local community and are heavily involved with the areas that surround them. This provides fertile ground for finding meaningful social service jobs, therefore, schools are ideal places for introducing national service programs. Unfortunately, this environment is of little value to the military.

The military stands to gain little from supporting school-based national service programs. Table 9 summarizes how School-Aged Service Programs will help the military accomplish its peacetime contingency missions.

Table 9 lists the evaluation criteria developed in Chapter 3, namely, relevancy, reliability, sufficiency, and timeliness, across the top of the table. The military's peacetime contingency missions are listed down the left side of the table. School-aged Service Programs are subjectively evaluated on how well they can perform each mission in accordance with each of the four criteria.

To receive a "high" overall rating on any given mission, the service program must offer substantive assistance to the military. The program's usefulness in performing that particular mission would be generally recognizable, though not necessarily obvious. A rating of "medium" would indicate a useful program that could potentially perform that particular mission but tends to be

TABLE 9
EFFICACY OF USING SCHOOL-AGED SERVICE PROGRAMS
TO PERFORM PEACETIME CONTINGENCY MISSIONS

Peacetime Contingency Missions	Relevancy	Reliability	Sufficiency	Timeliness	Overall
Disaster relief	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Emergency assistance	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Drug interdiction	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Nation assistance	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Security assistance	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Reconstitute forces	Low	NH	NH	NH	Low
BOTTOM LINE:					NH

LEGEND:

High = Very helpful to the military.
 Med = Some help to the military.
 Low = Little help to the military.
 NH = No Help to the military.

inadequate on either political, social, economic, or military grounds. A rating of "low" indicates a service program that has little probability of aiding the military. A rating of "no help" indicates a program with no redeeming value to the military. After the program is evaluated on

each mission it is given an overall rating of its value to the military. This is summed up by the proverbial "bottom line" in Table 9. A program with a "high" or "medium" bottom line is a program worthy of military support.

Overall, there is little practical value to the military from school-based national service programs. Only in the Reconstitute Forces missions does this form of national service appear to offer any value to the military, and at that, the support is weak. There are several reasons for this bleak view of school-based programs.

To begin with, most school-based programs are targeted for certain categories of youths. In secondary schools these programs are primarily geared for disadvantaged, out-of-school, and at-risk students, hence they address a segment of the youth cohort that is not attractive to the AVF. With the recent recruiting successes still fresh in their minds, the Services want to attract high-school graduates with strong academic aptitude, therefore, these youths are not desirable. If school-based programs are successful in awarding these youths some type of high-school equivalency degree, then the military might become interested. Until then, there is little relevancy to the military for supporting these programs.

Military participation in the Higher Education Innovative Projects for Community Service Program is also unwarranted. The volunteers in this program are already

enrolled in college and are not a major target of military recruiters. Although these students are desirable accessions, the military does not effectively compete with the labor market to fill its enlisted ranks with these students. Likewise, because the Services do not have any problems filling Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) positions with quality students, these students are of little value to the Officer Corps.

It is possible that participation in school-based programs could provide leadership skills and serve as a maturation vehicle for the volunteers. Although that may be true, these programs are not likely to provide any more "value-added" to the volunteers than the ROTC program itself. Additionally, academic schedules are tight and these voluntary jobs would strain the limited time available to ROTC students. These jobs would come at the expense of already limited military science courses. It is not relevant to the military to get involved in supporting school-based national service programs for college students.

Another major problem with school-based community service programs has to do with the role of the military in these projects. The military would not start at the ground level of these programs because many of these school-based service programs have been in existence for years. The movement from local to national-level programs simply involves expansion of existing programs. It is difficult to

imagine how the military would fit in philosophically and logistically with these existing programs.

In philosophical terms, it is not clear what objectives the military should have for school-based programs. By their very nature, these programs are geared toward addressing human services needs so they do not provide the military with any support for natural and environmental disaster relief, emergency assistance, nor the interdiction of illicit drugs. Because of their localized nature, these programs cannot support Allied and Friendly nations through nation assistance and security assistance. There are no peacetime contingency missions that can be performed, nor aided, by school-based national service programs. There are other practical problems with military participation in these programs.

The military would not be free to determine its own role in these programs. Through legislative fiat and public outcry, recruiting and indoctrination programs (classes) would be legally forbidden in school-based national service programs. The military would be left with organizing and providing logistical support for social welfare programs. Perhaps the military would even find itself taking over some of the functions previously performed by the schools. There are no clear objectives for military participation in school-based national service programs.

Logistically speaking, school-based programs are difficult to support. These programs are widely dispersed, with most of them in urban areas, and it would be a logistical nightmare to get military personnel involved in them. The large number of potential locations and the decentralized administration of the programs would make it difficult for the military to be actively engaged. To compound the problem, military participation in the programs would be resisted by church-sponsored organizations, college teachers and administrators, school boards, labor unions, State officials, and many other interest groups.

Current school-based programs do not have any military involvement. Approximately a quarter of the nation's independent schools have these programs and the number is increasing each year. These programs center around community-service projects, literacy programs, hospice and nursing home assistance, youth outreach programs, and human, educational, and linguistic needs, especially those that accompany poverty. These programs are arranged by the schools through the local civic and religious organizations and there is little federal, let alone military, involvement. Program supporters have strong feelings about local control. To these ardent supporters, it is not hyperbola to say that "it is in community service more than in any other sphere where the tradition of local

control is most important."¹³ Military involvement in these projects would be viewed by these people as an unnecessary federal intrusion into an area historically run by the States and local communities.

Military participation in school-based programs would be politically constrained by vocal community opposition. In the 1930s when the CCC was first introduced, local relief organizations protested military involvement and linked the militarization of volunteer work with fascism. Unwanted, and decidedly inexperienced in local service projects, military involvement in school-based programs would be a blunder in to a social and political quagmire.

The country is better served having local organizations, rather than the military, organize and supervise these programs, both in terms of political and religious sensibilities. Local organizations

possess valuable experience and skills in placing, training, supervising and evaluating volunteers and the experience gained from voluntary community service. ... For some projects a connection with the U.S. government [and particularly the military--emphasis added] would jeopardize the local sponsorship.¹⁴

¹³Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Hearing on H.R. 4330. The National Service Act of 1990 101st Cong., 2d sess., Serial No. 101-121, April 27, 1990, Committee Print, 57.

¹⁴Janet Schrock, Director, Brethren Volunteer Service, quoted in Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Hearing on H.R. 4330. The National Service Act of 1990 101st Cong., 2d sess., Serial No. 101-100, May, 17, 1990, Committee Print, 195.

School-based programs do not pass the military's "reliability" test because military involvement is not supported by the nation's school systems. For that reason, the military should avoid an imbroglio and stay away from school-based national service programs.

At this point the remaining evaluation criteria, sufficiency and timeliness, become superfluous. School-based national service programs provide no help to the military in accomplishing its peacetime contingency missions so the programs can hardly be called sufficient to meet the military's needs. Because military intrusion into these programs is politically unfeasible, now is not the time for the military to enter the national service debate championing school-based programs. These programs fail on all accounts on the sufficiency and timeliness criteria.

There are two caveats about the efficacy of school-based programs that make them of some value in assisting the military in its reconstitution mission. First, these programs could play a role in ameliorating teenage substance abuse. If these programs engage in activities that prevent and treat school-age drug and alcohol abuse and dependency, then the military will directly benefit from them. Military drug and alcohol abuse is certainly declining, however, problems still exist. Any program that addresses this abuse in the secondary schools will make things easier for the AVF. In any case, were the country to require a total

mobilization, school-based counter-drug programs would be of tangible value in reconstituting forces because of their contribution to preventing future drug problems. Given the low probability that reconstitution and total mobilization will be required in the immediate future, these are insufficient reasons to justify military involvement in school-based national service programs.

The second major benefit to the military of school-based national service programs has to do with inculcating "habits of the heart" to serve. In order to ensure a life-long commitment to service, these programs are required by legislation (in return for funding) to provide volunteers with information on VISTA, the Peace Corps, the Montgomery G.I. bill, and other service programs. Advertising the benefits of the Montgomery G.I. bill should aid military recruiting efforts to some degree. As accessions decline so too will advertising budgets and the need to publicize military incentive programs.

Overall, school-based national service programs potentially provide negligible assistance to the military in the performance of its peacetime contingency missions. There is insufficient justification for the military to be concerned with supporting this type of national service program.

The American Conservation and Youth Service Corps

The American Conservation and Youth Service Corps Act (ACYSCA) of 1990 is the most popular component of the Act, engendering the most congressional support and public sympathy. Under this portion of the Act, the Commission makes grants to States, to the Secretary of Agriculture, to the Secretary of the Interior, or to the Director of ACTION for the creation or expansion of full-time or summer conservation and youth corps programs. These programs include work in federal, state, and local environmental projects as well as community service projects. The differences between conservation and youth corps programs are in the nature of the work and its emphasis.

Conservation corps programs are not unique and there are many similarities among the numerous youth conservation corps programs throughout the country. There are currently sixty or so State and local conservation programs. The most famous programs of this type are the Youth Conservation Corps, the California Conservation Corps (CaCC), and the Young Adult Conservation Corps. The genesis of all the youth conservation programs dates back to the popular Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) of the 1930s. All of the programs are geared toward environmental protection and restoration, as well as disaster relief.

The Youth Service Corps are modelled on the Volunteers In Service To America (VISTA) program. VISTA was

initiated in the 1960s as sort of a domestic Peace Corps. Like VISTA, Youth Service Corps programs expand existing human services programs and include participation in

1. State, local, and regional governmental agencies;
2. Nursing homes, hospices, senior centers, hospitals, local libraries, parks, recreational facilities, child and adult day care centers, programs serving individuals with disabilities, and schools;
3. Law enforcement agencies, and penal and probation systems;
4. Private nonprofit organizations that primarily focus on social service such as community action agencies;
5. Activities that focus on the rehabilitation or improvement of public facilities, neighborhood improvements, literacy training, repairs to low-income housing, activities that focus on drug and alcohol abuse education, and improvements in natural resources on public lands;
6. Any other nonpartisan civic activities and services that the Commission determines to be worthy.¹⁵

The goals of these programs are to

offer full-time, productive work with visible community benefits in a natural resource or human setting and give participants a mix of work experience, basic and life skills, education, training, and support services.¹⁶

¹⁵United States Code, Public Law 101-610, 3143.

¹⁶Ibid., 4469.

Although Youth Service Corps programs primarily include community service work, they do not explicitly exclude environmental work. Examples of these programs include the New York City Volunteer Corps, City Year in Boston, the Chicago Youth Corps, the Youth Volunteer Corps of Greater Kansas City, and the Washington Service Corps in Washington State. There are approximately 50,000 participants annually in all programs.¹⁷ All of these projects provide a substantial social benefit in addressing unmet human, educational, or environmental needs in the community where service is performed.

Unlike school-based national service programs, ACYSCA programs are attractive to the AVF because their program attributes mirror many of the challenges of military service. This implies that some military peacetime contingency missions could be transferrable to ACYSCA programs. Table 10 outlines the efficacy of using ACYSCA programs to support peacetime contingency missions. The bottom line is that there is only limited value in pursuing these organizations for assistance in performing military missions.

Overall, ACYSCA programs appear promising to the military in selected areas. Because this assistance applies to several different peacetime contingency missions, the

¹⁷U.S. Congress, House, Hearing on H.R. 4330, 163.

bottom line on ACYSCA programs is that they are of some help to the military. This appraisal is qualified and is summed up in Table 10. There are several reasons for this guarded view of ACYSCA programs.

TABLE 10

EFFICACY OF USING THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION AND YOUTH
SERVICE CORPS PROGRAMS TO PERFORM PEACETIME
CONTINGENCY MISSIONS

					Overall
Peacetime Contingency Missions	Relevancy	Reliability	Sufficiency	Timeliness	
Disaster relief	Med	High	Med	Med	Med
Emergency assistance	Med	Low	Low	Med	Low
Drug interdiction	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Nation assistance	Med	Med	Low	Low	Med
Security assistance	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Reconstitute forces	High	Med	Low	Low	Med
BOTTOM LINE:					Med

LEGEND:

High = Very helpful to the military.
Med = Some help to the military.
Low = Little help to the military.
NH = No Help to the military.

Before analyzing ACYSCA programs, a distinction must be made between conservation and Youth Service Corps programs. Because of the local character of Youth Service Corps programs, and the deeply held distrust by its supporters concerning federal intrusion, there is little utility to the military for supporting these programs. The character of work in these programs is pseudo-social welfare and does not complement the military's HCA missions. However, the work in youth conservation programs might benefit the military.

Several peacetime contingency missions could be performed, or at least aided, by ACYSCA programs, especially youth conservation programs. By their very nature, conservation programs provide natural and environmental disaster relief and emergency assistance; these are very similar to two of the AVF's peacetime contingency missions. Several of the programs have spawned international organizations in Allied and Friendly nations, therefore, these programs have the potential to help the military in its execution of nation assistance missions. Perhaps the greatest advantage of these programs is in their potential contribution to reconstitution. In order to understand the practicality of these programs to the AVF it is important to know the origins of these programs and their objectives.

Origins of Conservation Programs

Today's conservation programs are modelled on the CCC which operated from 1933-1942. In 1933, America was in the midst of the Great Depression and newly elected President Franklin D. Roosevelt had a plan to put America back to work in conservation programs. He created the CCC to work on reforestation, erosion, flood control, park construction, and other public works projects. Volunteers were between 17-28 years of age and had an initial enrollment of six months which could be extended for up to two years. Naturally, there were age and enrollment exceptions.

The CCC is regarded as a political and social success. Today's CCC successor conservation programs perform a similar function of public service conservation and emergency assistance to respective localities. The California Conservation Corps (CaCC) is illustrative of the genre.

Members of the CaCC perform typical conservation work, such as planting trees, cutting trails, and cleaning streams, but they also work in urban environments. Volunteers construct playgrounds, restore historic buildings, and clean-up downtown centers. They also help in emergency situations such as sandbag detail during floods, fighting forest fires, and cleaning up after earthquakes and oil spills. The annual enrollment in CaCC is about 2000 volunteers, most of whom have never completed high-school.

Members take GED classes after work to improve their post-service employment prospects.

The conservation programs in the ACYSCA, like the CaCC, hold particular promise for the military. These programs complete projects that are labor intensive; involve teamwork, discipline, initiative, and physical exertion; and present leadership opportunities. In encouraging the expansion of these programs, the Act gives preferences for certain types of projects whose qualities are quite compatible with military tasks. Specifically, the Act encourages conservation programs that:

1. Will provide long-term benefits to the public;
2. Will instill a work ethic and a sense of public service in the participants;
3. Will be labor intensive, and involve youths operating in crews;
4. Can be planned and initiated promptly; and
5. Will enhance skills development and educational level and opportunities for the participants.¹⁸

The degree to which these programs aid the military does vary.

Military Usefulness of Conservation Programs

The most obvious peacetime contingency missions that can be performed by conservation national service programs

¹⁸United States Code, Public Law 101-610, 3146.

are disaster relief and emergency assistance. Volunteer conservation groups were involved in many relief operations that also involved military forces. These operations included fighting Yellowstone National Park fires in 1988; cleaning up after Hurricane Hugo in Charleston, SC; doing relief work in San Francisco, CA, following the 1988 earthquake; packing sandbags in Texas and Louisiana after major floods; and cleaning up in Alaska following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. This type of work is of some help to the military.

Disaster relief work by conservation programs is relevant to the military because it addresses a domestic problem that is also addressed by the AVF. National Guard units provide a variety of civil services during emergencies, such as flood control, rescue operations, riot control, property protection, evacuation, communications support, and clean up operations. In fiscal year 1990 alone, "there were 292 state emergencies that required call-ups of the [Army National] Guard."¹⁹ As mentioned before, both youth conservation groups and the AVF perform relief work. For the most part, youth organizations supplement, rather than replace, military forces involved in these operations. Nonetheless, use of these groups lessens the

¹⁹Gary L. Adams and Dwain L. Crowson, "The Army National Guard in a Changing Strategic Environment," Military Review 71, no. 10 (October 1991): 38.

need for military forces after assistance operations move out of the initial crisis phase. Clearly, this assistance complements the military in the performance of a primary State mission of National Guard forces. On moral grounds alone, the military should be willing to support the expansion of youth programs that can contribute to disaster relief. This does not necessarily extend to military support for a quid pro quo: expanded youth programs in return for military units in disaster relief.

Not all Guard disaster relief operations can be performed by civilians. For instance, civilian conservation groups cannot provide property protection and riot control. Therefore, from a sufficiency standpoint, these national service groups will always require AVF backup. However, it is clear that overlaps do exist between the operations of conservation groups and military forces. These forces should be used together where needed. But it not clear that States are better served by having their Guard forces perform all disaster relief operations because some jobs could otherwise be performed by youth conservation groups. This implies that it might not be efficient to use the AVF for all relief jobs in all cases. This is particularly true in terms of costs.

Costs of Youth Programs

Right now the military is striving to save money by reducing the size of its reserve forces as it conducts a simultaneous drawdown of active forces. A political maelstrom is brewing as reserve units protest force reductions and seek ways to preserve force structure. In justifying the retention of units, some Guard spokesmen have stressed the importance of State missions. In protesting his State's National Guard reductions, one spokesmen went so far as to say that "the National Guard is not part of our Cold War defense structure."²⁰ By implication, some States want to stress that the Guard's real role lies in performing State missions like emergency relief. The Army National Guard, by way of example, might be a case where Guard forces may not be cost effective for some disaster relief missions.

The Army National Guard grew by over 150,000 personnel between 1980 and 1990. This growth was justified for varied reasons but it was not generated by the growth in emergency missions. Army Secretary Michael Stone "expressed doubt that the emergency and civil work Guard units do at home has grown at the same pace the Guard expanded during the 1980s."²¹ The Department of Defense now wants to reduce

²⁰Greg Seigle, "Drawdown Targets Historic Guard Units," Army Times 33 (March 16, 1992): 10.

²¹Bernard Adelsberger, "Army Ups Bid to Cut Reserves," Army Times 33 (March 16, 1992): 4.

the reserves in order to save money but the reserves claim that they must perform these disaster relief missions.

Youth conservation programs may be able to accomplish some of these missions in lieu of Guard forces and do so in an efficient, consistent manner and not at excessive costs.

Several studies have been conducted to determine the costs of youth conservation programs. Not surprisingly, the conclusions are mixed because the average costs of programs vary according to specific conditions and assumptions. The Act itself stipulates attractive benefits for participants. The Act calls for post-service benefits for volunteers of \$100 per week, or \$5000 per year, whichever is less, for each week served in the program. In addition, a full-time volunteer will receive a living allowance equal to 100 percent of the poverty line for a family of two. The Act also calls for program agencies to provide health insurance for volunteers. Assuming that the typical volunteer serves full-time for one year, is in the 15 percent tax bracket, and receives health insurance, the cost per participant is approximately \$14,707.²² Non-federal sources can further

²²Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990, 423. This and other current estimates were put in 1992 dollars using the Implicit Price Deflators for Gross National Product from Congress, House, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Indicators, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., January 1992, Committee Pamphlet, 3. The assumed implicit price deflator rate for 1992 was 2.6 percent and the rise in real per capita personal income is 1.0 percent.

The pre-tax poverty line for two is \$7,834 per year, plus the tax-free health insurance is \$1210 (Walter Y. Oi's

supplement the benefits. By way of comparison, another estimate of the cost per participant in a nonresidential conservation program authorized under the Act is approximately \$17,400 per position (in current dollars), excluding overhead.²³ A cost comparison of several national programs is found later in this chapter in the National and Community Service Act section.

The costs for youth conservation programs do not appear overly excessive. This is particularly true when one considers that the mean dollar earnings for a male full-time worker with a high-school degree, between the ages of 18-24 years of age, is \$15,342.²⁴ The figures for the CaCC are comparable to this amount, however, most of the youths in conservation programs are not high-school graduates. The per person costs for all national service programs are lower than the costs of maintaining active-duty privates. However,

1990 figure with 10 percent inflation), plus the tax-free \$4767 post-service benefit (the \$5000 benefit discounted six months at 10 percent), calculated at a tax rate of 15 percent, works out to approximately \$14,707 per volunteer per year. See the similar calculation in Walter Y. Oi, "National Service: Who Bears the Costs and Who Reaps the Gains?," National Service: Pro and Con, ed. Williamson M. Evers (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 102.

²³Danzig, 211. Original estimate was in 1985 dollars.

²⁴Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990, Table 733, 453; updated using personal income figures from U.S. Congress, House, Economic Indicators, 6.

the length of tour, job requirements, and a host of other factors are not similar.

Youth program costs rise significantly when overhead costs are figured in. Charles Moskos has estimated that the administrative costs of a national service program would be approximately \$50 million per year in 1982 dollars; or roughly \$67 million in today's dollars.²⁵ The Congressional Budget Office found in 1980, from experience with other job programs, that administrative expenses were between 9-13 percent of total expenses for service programs.²⁶ These costs are above and beyond the costs for running existing youth service programs.

The William T. Grant Foundation Commission on Work, Family and Citizen reported in 1988 that

A cost/benefit analysis of the California Conservation Corps shows that the combined value of its work and impact on post-program earnings very nearly equals the costs of running the corps and this finding is likely to be true of other corps as well.²⁷

The phrase "very nearly equals" is damning praise for the cost effectiveness of the CaCC. The report later adds (incongruently) that the CaCC incurs \$1.34 in benefits for each \$1 spent on the program. In its own publicity publications, the CaCC brags that "for every \$1 spent on the

²⁵Danzig, 148.

²⁶Slackman, 34.

²⁷U.S. Congress, House, Hearing on H.R. 4330, 165.

CaCC, \$1.77 in benefits is returned to taxpayers.²⁸ A Human Environment Center Study of the CaCC estimates that for every \$1.00 spent the program yields \$1.60; for the Pennsylvania Conservation Corps it's \$1.36; and for the Michigan Conservation Corps it's \$2.00.²⁹ By comparison, the G.I. Bill paid \$3.00 back for every \$1.00 it spent. Some estimates of the old Job Corps claim it paid for itself and that the value of its benefits exceeded its costs by \$2300 per volunteer.³⁰ It appears conservation programs payback to society more than they incur in costs, albeit the amounts and payback periods are in dispute.

Based on these cost estimates it appears to be cost effective to employ youth groups where the situation allows. Although not every national service job can be valued at these encouraging rates of return, the military should not summarily dismiss the idea of expanding national service conservation programs.

A fundamental question must be answered about expanding youth conservation national service programs. Should society be willing to pay nearly \$15,000 for a conservation job that the marketplace is not willing to pay for? Maybe any payment for this type of work is

²⁸Ibid., 127.

²⁹Danzig, 64.

³⁰Sherraden, 172.

overpayment. It is difficult to assign a value to the jobs created by conservation programs. To complicate things, specific determination of what constitutes costs and benefits are subject to interpretation. The economic costs of conservation programs seem highly subjective, and even if true, they might not be applicable to an expanded program.

In order to determine cost efficiency, the cost of youth conservation programs should be compared with the cost of maintaining reserve forces for the same work.

Unfortunately, this comparison is almost impossible to calculate because the reserves are maintained for so much more than disaster relief and emergency assistance. These forces are retained in order to preserve a range of military force options as well as to provide disaster relief. The multiplicative value of these forces makes cost comparisons with conservation programs a risky business, at best.

Disaggregating that portion of reserve costs that apply to past relief operations provides insufficient data for making force mix decisions.

It is too simplistic to use cost figures derived from past emergency operations to justify cutting a certain percentage of the reserves in exchange for an increase in youth conservation programs. First, it is impossible to anticipate the future costs, size, and number of relief operations, therefore, it is problematic to choose the

appropriate size of reserve and youth groups. This might cause the wrong mix of the two to be constructed.

Secondly, the reserves, because of their range of capabilities, are not a perfect substitute for conservation forces. Because of its organizational abilities and organic equipment, the military is good at crisis-action management and responds quicker to disaster situations than conservation groups. The inherent flexibility of reserve forces to switch missions and change the tempo and nature of their work argues for a preservation of a larger portion of these forces than costs would otherwise dictate. The other attractive attribute of these forces is that they can be compelled to work in ugly and inhospitable environments, unlike the volunteer workers in youth programs. The last major sticking point in substituting between the two forces relates to training.

The AVF is not in a hurry to drop any humanitarian missions, international nor domestic. This questions the reliability of expanding conservation programs to handle emergency relief measures for the military. Disaster relief missions serve as useful training vehicles for military forces.

Reserve forces have been used extensively for HCA missions. As part of their training, reserve units operating in Latin America have "built roads, airfields, and schools; provided health care and social services; and

developed and maintained communications and logistics networks."³¹ The most recent work was on Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama. Reserve units have also performed this type of work in places like Tonga, Niger, Malawi, Cote d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Mauritania, Cameroon, and Guinea, among others. Similar missions were also performed by reserve units as part of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Military disaster relief operations also serve as training vehicles. Reserves have participated on several recent disaster relief operations, such as earthquake relief assistance in El Salvador and the Philippines and hurricane assistance to the Solomon Islands. Just using Army Guardsmen as an example, in 1990 alone, they received valuable training by providing "relief and assistance during 77 natural disasters and six civil disturbances."³²

The active forces are also receiving valuable training from the increasing number of HCA missions.

Observers note:

humanitarian missions such as Operation Provide Comfort, which saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Kurds, ... could be one model [of new missions] for the future.³³

³¹William F. Ward, Army Reserve Special Report 1991 (U.S. Army Reserve Command, 1991), 64.

³²Gary L. Adams and Dwain L. Crowson, "The Army National Guard in a Changing Strategic Environment," Military Review 71, no. 10 (October 1991): 38.

³³Bruce B. Auster, "The Pentagon's Scramble to Stay Relevant," U.S. News and World Report, December 30,

Among other operations within the last two years, the Air Force flew relief supplies to the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Navy provided an inoculation program in Africa, the Army has provided medical and engineering assistance to Honduras and Panama, and the Marines provided emergency help to flood victims in Bangladesh and lava flow victims in Italy. These are only a few examples of the numerous HCA missions performed by the military. These operations serve as "one way to show the flag [and] to provide some training for troops in an uncertain world."³⁴ If for no other reasons than to preserve force structure and enhance readiness, the military does not want to have civilian forces replace military units in disaster relief operations. In addition, the military is better equipped, manned, and trained for relief operations and performs these emergency tasks as valuable proxies for combat experience.

The military wants to retain the capabilities to perform both international and domestic relief operations. Although conservation groups have some international links, most of their work is internal within the borders of the United States. Essentially, there are few international prospects for employing youth conservation groups. For that reason, conservation national service programs provide no

1991/January 6, 1992, 52.

³⁴Ibid.

potential help to the military in performing its security assistance mission.

Reconstitution and Conservation Programs

The one mission that ACYSCA programs might help fulfill above all others is the reconstitution mission. Youth conservation programs might be an effective way to train a cohort of youths that could be drawn upon by the government in the event of a future total mobilization. The support for this contention is based on the historical experience of the military with the CCC.

The military, specifically the Army, reluctantly cooperated with the fledgling CCC. But with more than 25 percent of the United States unemployed in 1933, and no obvious external threat to the country at that time, there was little justification for military resistance to the program. Besides, the Army realized it was the only institution capable of running such a large program. In part, pragmatic officers supported the program in a quid pro quo for suspension of planned officer reductions and budget cuts.

Despite its reluctance, the Army became responsible for the organization, logistics, and operation of the CCC camps. Administration of the camps, project selection, and work oversight were controlled by the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. From 1933 to 1942 over three

million men participated in the CCC. The Army's reputation soared because of the efficiency and professionalism it displayed in running the CCC camps. This positive public image undoubtedly played a role in instituting the first peacetime draft in 1940.

Even after the CCC's apparent initial success, the military was not entirely pleased with its participation in the program. Despite the favorable press the military received from the program, many officers wanted to extricate the military from the CCC. They felt that no level of peacetime relief activities could justify restricting national defense capabilities.³⁵ A minority view simply insisted that the Army should not be involved in any non-military activities. Some officers felt that recruiting was adversely affected because CCC volunteers worked shorter hours and received higher pay than enlisted soldiers. Additionally, the military was miffed because it was not allowed to recruit at CCC camps.

There are other reasons why the military is reluctant to support conservation programs. Some studies "conclude that most forms of national service would not improve the quality... of the military."³⁶ The military is recalcitrant

³⁵Bob Cohn, "Doing Something Meaningful: A National Service Program Helps Urban Youths," Newsweek, August 28, 1989, 38.

³⁶Danzig, 273.

in supporting these programs because the expected volunteers offer little promise as future recruits.

The military argues that conservation program participants are not good enlistment prospects. The military's standards have gone up and it wants to recruit only high-school graduates. The experiences of the CCC in this area are enlightening. The enrollees in the CCC were chosen by local relief agencies based on State population quotas. The criteria for enrollment was based on need, therefore, the poorest youths were chosen to participate.³⁷ These youths had very few skills and many tended to be illiterate. This is much like the current volunteers in conservation programs. The CCC gave its participants rudimentary work skills and taught many of them basic reading and writing skills. The training and educational programs for the youths was extremely valuable to them. Many participants in the CCC became skilled laborers and later served in the military. The youths in today's conservation programs should theoretically possess the same aptitude as the volunteers from the 1930s. The military disagrees with that assessment.

³⁷Gerald M. Brennan, "Military's Peacetime Role (Implications of the Civilian Conservation Corps Experience)," (MMAS Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1986), 25.

Today's conservation programs cater to high-school dropouts, illiterates, and youths that have trouble finding and keeping regular jobs. This is a generalization borne out by facts.³⁸ This is also not surprising: few businesses wish to employ these kinds of workers, these youths cannot go to college, and the military certainly will not accept them. Conservation jobs provide some training and a wage; additionally, the Act stipulates that each conservation program must enhance the educational skills of its participants. All participants lacking a high-school diploma must seek one (or its equivalent) during the program. The military does not want to become involved in these programs and end up as a social welfare organization; it does not want to do the job of the school systems. Youths in existing programs appear to be poor prospects as recruits, the military argues, so it is not in its interests to participate in conservation programs.

That argument is similar to the one the military gave in 1932 when it initially voiced its opposition to the CCC. At that time the military feared "dealing with the type of people who were on the relief roles."³⁹ The experiences of the CCC changed the military's mind about these kinds of youths. Today's youth are no less promising, but

³⁸Cohn, 38.

³⁹Brennan, 48.

educational problems may be more intransigent today. Volunteers today do not lack the opportunities to advance themselves as much as they lack the abilities, for whatever reasons. The military may be correct in drawing a distinction between circumstances in 1933 and 1992.

The military's exposure to the CCC had positive externalities. The regular Army was heavily involved in the initial mobilization and organization work of the CCC. Within one year, only a few hundred regular officers and enlisted men remained involved in the CCC; the bulk of the work was turned over to reserve forces. What made the military happy was its ability to instill discipline in the youths. Although this was not "military" discipline in the strictest sense, there "was a semblance of military life in the camps."⁴⁰ This included formations, inspections, details, and marching. This preparation paid dividends for those who later served in World War II.

Other benefits to the military were more pronounced. The Director of the CCC, Robert Fechner, claimed that CCC volunteers were "85 percent prepared for military life and could be turned into first-class fighting men at almost an instant's notice."⁴¹ The CCC taught teamwork and discipline that benefited both the recipients and the military.

⁴⁰Ibid., 59.

⁴¹Ibid., 94.

The mobilization of the CCC in 1933-34 also served as a dress rehearsal for the large mobilization required for World War II. All the administrative and logistic problems encountered in 1941 were first practiced in 1934. The leadership skills required to change a civilian group into an organized, disciplined team were present in the start-up of the CCC camps. These potential benefits have clear applicability today to the military's reconstitution mission.

Because of the impending force reductions taking place by fiscal year 1995, the military has little power to preserve its existing mobilization capability. Large personnel cuts and the questionable status of the implementation of cadre forces both threaten the military's ability to mobilize. A large standing reserve and/or universal training program are not economically feasible in today's budgetary climate. In the event of total mobilization the military will experience significant delays in fielding new units and replacing casualties unless there are pre-trained individuals available to recruit. The Individual Ready Reserve only provides a limited source of personnel for these purposes. Once that manpower pool is exhausted, the military has few individuals to fall back on in an emergency. Youths trained in conservation programs might be an improved source of semi-skilled, or at least disciplined, accessions. Compared with the alternative, no

youth training whatsoever, the military can better support its reconstitution mission by supporting conservation programs. Although this evaluation is speculative, the lessons of the CCC support this position.

The CCC experience provides further justification for military cooperation with conservation programs. The CCC camps provided a great opportunity to share military ideas with a large group of potential soldiers and served as effective leadership laboratories for junior leaders. Because CCC volunteers were not subject to military regulations, officers learned to lead, instead of threaten and cajole their followers. The Army considered CCC camp "command the best field experience the reservist could get, and wanted the maximum number to have the opportunity."⁴² The military also directly benefited from CCC conservation work on military installations. On net, the military benefitted from the CCC program; this supports the viewpoint that the military can gain from helping conservation programs.

The same benefits that the military reaped from the CCC could potentially be reaped today through military support for youth conservation programs. A window of opportunity exists to support ACYSCA programs because these programs are evolutionary, they simply expand existing

⁴²Ibid., 66.

programs. Therefore, military assistance can be executed within existing bureaucratic processes and legislative guidelines without further legal action. The military could support these programs immediately. Military forces, perhaps even reserve forces, could develop pilot programs to organize and support some of the expanded conservation programs.

As it stands here are no restrictions within the Act's provisions against military participation. There are restrictions against businesses, labor unions, political groups, personal service companies, and religious associations. Interestingly, the Act includes grants to federal agencies. The Act states that

if a State has failed to establish a youth corps program and no local youth corps programs exists within such State, the Commission may make a grant to a Federal agency to directly administer a youth corps program.⁴³

There is historical precedence for this: the CCC involved the departments of War, Labor, Agriculture, and Interior, as well as State and local agencies. There is an open door for DoD involvement.

The Act encourages widespread involvement of Federal agencies. The Commission is encouraged to develop joint programs with other Federal agencies. The only specific mention of military involvement is in logistical support.

⁴³United States Code, Public Law 101-610, 3140.

The Commission is charged to (whenever possible)

make arrangements with the Secretary of Defense to have logistical support provided by a military installation near the work site, including the provision of temporary tent centers where needed, and other supplies and equipment.⁴⁴

The Act allows for residential conservation programs without specifically tasking the military to organize and administer such camps. The Act does not exclude such DoD participation.

In order to improve its ability to perform its disaster relief, emergency assistance, and reconstitution missions, the military could again assume responsibility for the organization, logistics, and operation of several CCC-style camps. The administration of the camps and project operations could again be left to other agencies. Military support does not require a large commitment of manpower. It has been estimated that "roughly 1 percent of the active-duty Army personnel would have to be allocated to the training of...national service participants;" this in a program as large as even 100,000 youths.⁴⁵ Although several of today's proposed national service programs are designed for large-scale participation (upwards to 800,000), none of them anticipate enrollments anywhere approaching 100,000 volunteers. The military could test the desirability of

⁴⁴Ibid., 3148.

⁴⁵Danzig, 274.

supporting national service programs by providing limited support to a small conservation program.

The environment is one area that lends itself quite naturally to military-civilian cooperation. Numerous military bases and facilities are being turned over to civilian control as the AVF downsizes. Many of these facilities have environmental waste problems. DoD claims that the sins of the past have not been forgiven and that it "takes seriously its environmental responsibilities."⁴⁶ Although the bulk of environmental cleanup operations require workers skilled in handling hazardous materials, some of the cleanup programs can use unskilled manpower. The military could employ conservation groups in selective clean-up projects of facilities.

Environmental cleanup projects could serve as useful experiments for determining the benefits of military association with national service programs. Like it did during the 1930s, the military could provide bare-based logistical and administrative support for these projects. This kind of support is already sanctioned, and encouraged, under the Act. The military could provide transportation, camp-style housing, food, training, and limited medical attention to conservation organizations working on military clean-up projects. The goal would be to determine if

⁴⁶Cheney, 46.

running these camps would provide the same benefits to the military as the CCC camps did during the 1930s. These camps would serve as training exercises (proxies) for mobilization. Besides the environmental and civic benefits, these camps would serve as the foundation for reconstituting military manpower in the event of global crises. The Reserve Component could eventually take over these camps. This would allow the reserves to retain additional force structure and give them time to see how they might further integrate disaster relief and emergency assistance operations with civilian groups.

Although an expansion of national service conservation programs seems laudatory, the funding for such programs will be difficult to obtain. Given the immense budget restrictions put in place by the government's budget agreements in October 1990, an expansion of these programs will not take place within a reasonable time. Current economic conditions, exacerbated by election year politics, probably doom any expansion of job programs. The history of the CCC suggests that such an expansion would

likely be enacted only when alternative economic and educational opportunities were so poor and military manpower demands so low as to leave a large portion of the population, and especially of youth, without an obviously useful occupation.⁴⁷

⁴⁷Danzig, 276.

Youth conservation programs are capable of providing some assistance to the military in disaster relief and emergency assistance operations. Small groups have proven themselves to be tireless, mobile, and eager to assist in these operations. Although these groups do not appear to be overly expensive to fund vis-a-vis the military, the military's costs understate the true value of its manpower because of its capabilities to perform other wartime missions.

The military has its own reasons for not supporting conservation groups in the performance of relief operations. As military budgets shrink, the Reserve Components are eager to find ways to preserve force structure. They warn their legislative representatives that reserve force reductions should not follow some "arbitrary percentage basis when the active component is reduced," rather, they argue that there should be "increased mission assignments" for the Reserves and "full consideration of Reserve Component cost-effectiveness" in performing these missions.⁴⁸ These calls do not go unheeded by legislators. Both Houses of Congress are likely to require the active component to rely more, not less, on reserves forces for peacetime contingency missions. Despite the fact that the ACYSCA offers potential assistance

⁴⁸ Reserve Forces Policy Board, Department of Defense, Reserve Component Programs: Fiscal Year 1990 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990): 41-42.

to the military in the performance of some of its missions, this potential help is likely to go unrequited.

National and Community Service Act

The third major category in the Act is the National and Community Service Act. This portion of the Act authorizes the Commission to make grants to States for the creation of full- and part-time national and community service programs. The purpose of this provision is to encourage States to develop an effective model for a large-scale national service program.

The Act provides seed money to States to develop a pilot program for other States or regions, or perhaps the federal government, to imitate. Interestingly, there are no restrictions on sponsoring organizations and States are free to solicit federal agencies, including DoD. The purpose of this portion of the Act is to create volunteer organizations that satisfy unmet educational, human, environmental, and public safety needs. The value to the military of using this portion of the Act to further its peacetime contingency missions is shown in Table 11. The bottom line is that a national or regional national service program will contribute little to the military's success.

This portion of the Act makes national service truly "national." All other sections of the Act simply expand existing service programs without necessarily making them

TABLE 11

EFFICACY OF USING NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY
SERVICE ACT PROGRAMS TO PERFORM
PEACETIME CONTINGENCY MISSIONS

Peacetime Contingency Missions	Relevancy	Reliability	Sufficiency	Timeliness	Overall
Disaster relief	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Emergency assistance	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Drug interdiction	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Nation assistance	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Security assistance	NH	NH	NH	NH	NH
Reconstitute forces	Low	Low	Low	NH	Low
BOTTOM LINE:					Low

LEGEND:

High = Very helpful to the military.
 Med = Some help to the military.
 Low = Little help to the military.
 NH = No Help to the military.

national in scope. This section of the Act encourages experimentation to see if any local or regional service programs generate enough interest, or solve enough social problems, to warrant national expansion.

Like the expansion of national service conservation programs, multiple-state or federal national service programs seem like good ideas but they suffer from terrible timing. In an era of budget deficits, an increase in government spending and the creation of another government bureaucracy will face adverse political pressure. The seed money specified in the Act for these programs only hints at the immense costs for a large national service program.

The total authorizations in the Act to carry out national expansion of service programs are truly inadequate. The authorizations specify \$56 million in 1991, \$95.5 million in 1992, and \$105 million in 1993 for these programs. None of the money found its way into appropriations. In addition to these authorizations, the Act also authorizes funds to offset costs to existing programs. For instance, student loan paybacks can be deferred for certain types of community service and partial loan cancellations are possible for service in the Peace Corps. The amounts for these deferrals and cancellations (and some additional funding for Youthbuild Projects and Student Literacy Corps) are \$5 million in 1991, \$7.5 million in 1992, and \$10 million in 1993. These sums are miniscule compared with the estimated costs of a widespread program.

The decision on which national service program to expand will determine how much the program will cost. Suffice it to say that none of the programs are cheap.

Proponents of each program have to estimate how well each program will attract volunteers and must make estimates of the degree of private funding. Recent cost estimates of several large scale national service programs are shown in Table 12.

TABLE 12
COST ESTIMATES OF SEVERAL LARGE SCALE
NATIONAL SERVICE PROGRAMS

PROPOSED NATIONAL SERVICE PROGRAM	ESTIMATED MAXIMUM PARTICIPANTS	COSTS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS	
		AS PROPOSED	1992 DOLLARS
American Conservation Corps (alone)	25,000	\$500 (1985)	\$632
Citizen Corps (large & small); (\$10,000 service vouchers/year vs. \$5000)	800,000	\$1,360	\$1,632
	250,000	\$1,000 (1987)	\$1,200
Citizenship and National Service Act (all types)	700,000	\$3,960- \$14,740 (1987)	\$4,752- \$17,688
Voluntary National Service (all types)	120,000	\$2,600 (1985)	\$3,288
National Service Corps (all types; in lieu of student loan programs)	350,000	\$18,500 (1986)	\$22,910

Sources: See Danzig, 212; Evers, 97; and Daniel J. Busby, "The Call for National Service and Its Economic Costs," Master of Science Thesis, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988, 96-117. All costs are put in 1992 dollars using the implicit GNP deflators from U.S. Congress, House, Economic Indicators, 3.

Table 12 lists the estimated number of participants and current costs, in millions of dollars per year, to run national programs. The programs listed are not similar. If a program has a major change in benefits or costs compared with the programs in the Act, then the major difference is shown in parenthesis below the program name. The key point to take away from Table 12 is the magnitude of the costs for national programs. In fact, these costs are an order of magnitude higher than the authorizations allowed in the Act. A comprehensive national service program is very expensive and the number of beneficiaries from these programs is relatively small. Recall from Figure 1 that over 3.2 million youths turn eighteen years-of-age each year. The national service programs in Table 12 offer employment for only a fraction of the youth cohort. As an additional point of reference, the General Accounting Office estimates that "an outright draft at half current pay could end up costing more [\$18 billion more] than today's volunteer Army."⁴⁹

The costs of a "national" national service program are prohibitively expensive. Given the government's current fiscal situation, this section of the Act offers little promise to the military because its prospects for serious funding and attention are bleak. The government can ill afford to create another jobs program (some would call it an

⁴⁹"Sam Nunn Wants You," The New Republic (June 6, 1988): 4.

entitlements program) so this section of the Act is not relevant to the AVF. To complicate matters, the expansion of national service programs might make them of questionable value to the military.

Even if they were affordable, large scale national service programs are not relevant to the military because the value of program outputs is suspect. The most promising value of wide-spread national service is the prospect of improving the country's ability to reconstitute. Expansion of these programs could provide the military with

an indispensable base of training that will enable us to build up our civilian reserve components, shorten the time needed for mobilizing these units and for preparing them to ... [fight].⁵⁰

The current downsizing of the military endangers the nation's ability to mobilize its manpower in the event of a sudden escalation of hostilities. National service programs could theoretically serve as proxies for military service, insomuch as they mature and discipline the youths who volunteer. They may be a poor substitute for military service but there are currently no alternatives. Even this supposed advantage of national service has been called in to question.

Poorly run national service programs might do the country more harm than good. Most programs would suffer from

⁵⁰Ibid., 30-31.

short terms of participation, high attrition rates (upwards to 66 percent), and a high proportion of immature ... participants with limited skills, [that] would keep the value of labor relatively low.⁵¹

The average volunteer stays with the CaCC for roughly 70 days. Poorly motivated, uneducated and ill-trained workers have high turnover rates and are not likely to produce valuable output. Unfortunately, there is no record of a highly successful, large scale national service program. Volunteer programs that boast of success are often small programs; for example, the CaCC only employs 2000 youths per year. The way the national service program is structured in the Act (see Figures 3 and 4), the military has no direct influence over the administration of these programs. Without such influence, the military could suffer by association with poorly run and organized national service programs.

Expanding national service might interfere with the civilian labor market and military recruiting. Programs under the Act cannot displace existing programs, displace any employee or position, nor cause a reduction in wages, hours, or benefits to employees. Labor unions opposed the CCC, the largest national service program this country has seen. In 1933, the biggest fears were militarization of labor and the low "dollar-a-day" wage.⁵² Union opposition

⁵¹Danzig, 269.

⁵²Brennan, 20.

to national service still exists today but for different reasons. In a wide-spread national service program it is unlikely that civilian jobs would be unaffected by the entrance into the job market of low paid, low skilled voluntary workers, no matter how hard the Commission tried to avoid competing with the labor market. Labor unions fear that the stipends paid to volunteers in national service programs will affect the general wage scale and thwart attempts to raise the minimum wage. If the wage scale falls Congress may be tempted to lower military recruiting incentives; this will decrease the number of high-quality youths entering the military.

The creation of national programs might indirectly cost the military resources it does not intend to provide. Expanding well-run, small national service programs may not necessarily realize increasing returns to scale, in terms of output or costs. Demeaning work, "make" work, or underemployment may all result from expanded programs. Costs could balloon as overhead costs increase or labor force workers are displaced by volunteer programs. Some economists argue that "the notion...[that] national service programs would accomplish public work at bargain prices is...an illusion."⁵³ The heavily decentralized nature of the command and control structure of the Act might not be

⁵³Ibid.

able to cope with an expanded program that sputters. Without necessarily supporting the creation of national service, the military may be called to "bail it out" should it be created and then fail.

Despite the alleged value to youths, there is insufficient evidence that a large scale national service program is the best way of aiding youth. Economists argue that other measures would be more cost effective in achieving the goals of national service. For instance, "tax cuts, eliminating the minimum wage, loosening the rules governing the youth minimum wage, or expanding apprenticeship programs and job training" might be a cheaper way of accomplishing the goals of large scale national service.⁵⁴ The military should support these measures before supporting a wide-spread national service program.

The only peacetime contingency mission that a large scale national service program could support is reconstitution. Because the value of the output of the labor is questionable and the decentralized structure of the program shuns active military participation and control, the military should not support expanding national service.

⁵⁴Evers, xxv.

Governors' Innovative Service Programs

The Governors' Innovative Service Programs are grants to States for the creation of "innovative volunteer and community service programs" which build on existing programs and address human, educational, environmental and public safety needs.⁵⁵

The Governors' Program is an ill-defined section of the Act. Its intent is to use economic incentives to spur innovative ideas on how to provide community services. The program is a legislative lark that specifies no criteria for the award of grants and funds. The bottom line is, as specified, this provision of the Act has no discernable value to the military. Because this program does not provide any assistance with peacetime contingency missions, the military should not support this program.

Peace Corps and ACTION

The Act gives more money to the Peace Corps and ACTION to expand their programs. Program objectives under this portion of the Act include the goal of attracting a greater number of citizens to public service, including older volunteers. The Peace Corps attracts an older, better educated and trained volunteer. ACTION works primarily with citizens 60 years and older who volunteer their services to help meet basic human needs of low-income individuals,

⁵⁵United States Code, Public Law 101-610, 3156.

although they have volunteers of all ages. ACTION Programs include Volunteers in Service To America (VISTA), Student Community Service Program, Older American Volunteer Programs (Foster Grandparent Program, Retired Senior Volunteer Program, and the Senior Companion Program), among others. Because of the age of ACTION volunteers, and type of work, this program offers nothing to the military. The Peace Corps has something to offer.

Most national service programs involve strictly domestic jobs. In most cases, this is rightly so: it is inappropriate to use national service programs to put young people in harm's way in foreign countries. There are, however, opportunities to expand some national service programs overseas without endangering U.S. citizens. One area for increased youth participation is the Peace Corps.

Peace Corps Volunteers are often considered America's best representatives. The Peace Corps has been so well received that even the Japanese have copied the program. There are over 100,000 returned Peace Corps volunteers, speaking over 200 languages, and with knowledge of over 100 nations. The military has done little to tap this valuable resource for military service.

The military should support continued expansion of the Peace Corps through national service programs. Although the average age of Peace Corps volunteers is 31 years of age, volunteers can be as young as 20 years of age. The

most important value of Peace Corps volunteers, from the military perspective, is that they possess first-hand data on the political, social, and religious conditions of areas in which they work. Table 13 shows the value of the Peace Corps to the military.

TABLE 13

EFFICACY OF USING THE PEACE CORPS TO PERFORM
PEACETIME CONTINGENCY MISSIONS

					Timeliness
				Sufficiency	
			Reliability		
		Relevancy			
Peacetime Contingency Missions					Overall
Disaster relief		Low	Low	Low	Low
Emergency assistance		Low	Low	Low	Med
Drug interdiction		NH	NH	NH	NH
Nation assistance		Med	Med	Low	Low
Security assistance		Low	Low	Low	Low
Reconstitute forces		NH	NH	NH	NH
BOTTOM LINE:					Low

LEGEND:

High = Very helpful to the military.
 Med = Some help to the military.
 Low = Little help to the military.
 NH = No Help to the military.

The bottom line is that the Peace Corps has valuable skills to offer the military in overseas areas. Therefore, they can contribute to the military's security and nation assistance missions.

The greatest area of potential benefit from the Peace Corps is in security assistance. Peace Corps volunteers currently work in over 90 countries, most of which are in the Third World and many of which do not have formal Security Assistance Offices (SAO). Besides their linguistic skills, which are extremely valuable, these workers possess detailed knowledge of local political, social, and economic conditions in many areas of the world that face the prospect of Low Intensity Conflict. This knowledge is important to Country Teams and SAOs.


The big problem for the military in taking advantage of increased enrollment in the Peace Corps is getting to the volunteers. The Peace Corps formally falls under the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance for supervision purposes. Although the Peace Corps is an independent Federal agency, the President "has assigned the Secretary of State the authority and responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. interdepartmental activities overseas."⁵⁶ Therefore, Peace Corps programs are

⁵⁶U.S. Army, FM 100-20, A-0.

overseen by the Department of State. This relationship is seen in Figure 5.

The military does not have easy access to the Peace Corps. "Getting to the volunteers" is, of course, not what the military would attempt to do. First, this would inevitably alienate every Peace Corps supporter. Second, co-opting the Peace Corps would simply give foreigners the perception that the military controlled them and all their good intentions would be held suspect. Instead, the Peace Corps should remain very distant from military intervention. But this does not mean that these volunteers should be off limits to military interaction and support.

FIGURE 5
SUPERVISION OF THE PEACE CORPS




The military should interact with Peace Corps activities through appropriate liaison channels. This organizational link does not currently exist. Military personnel fall under the SAO, also known as "joint U.S. military advisory group", "U.S. military training mission", or some other designation. There are no formal military links with other operational elements of U.S. foreign assistance agencies that do not pass through the Ambassador's Country Team. The Country Team serves as a central coordination point for concerted U.S. assistance operations as well as a filter and barrier to intelligence collection actions. Figure 6 illustrates the organizational structure of Foreign Assistance Operations.

The only direct link between the military and the Peace Corps is through the Ambassador. To integrate foreign assistance programs the military should place liaison officers with the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development (USAID), both of which are in positions to receive volunteers from national service programs.

USAID manages U.S. developmental, humanitarian, and civic assistance activities. Some of its programs involve security assistance, however, most of it is humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). The bulk of the HCA is simply food distribution and medical programs. These programs employ international volunteers and involve many young,

FIGURE 6
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS



Source: United States Army, FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), A-10.

inexperienced workers that provide the "leg work" needed to distribute foodstuffs and literature. Again, the main value to the military is not from the relief work but from intelligence support. Of course, the disaster relief and emergency assistance also contribute to accomplishing the military's HCA operations. The intelligence assistance will help correct a deficiency found in both Operations JUST CAUSE (Panama) and DESERT STORM (Iraq), namely, that U.S. human intelligence (HUMINT) operations in-country were woefully inadequate prior to the initiation of hostilities.

Military support of expanded national service programs within the Peace Corps and USAID might help redress that weak area.

The big drawback to the expansion of Peace Corps programs is that volunteers must have already completed two years of a four year college education before they volunteer. Strangely, the Act further limits expansion of the Peace Corps by specifying that a maximum of only fifty individuals can participate in training programs established under the Act. Perhaps the relatively small size of the Peace Corps, and its high per-person expense, make it a poor candidate for expansion. The Peace Corps employs less than 10,000 volunteers a year, nonetheless, because of where these volunteers are employed, the Peace Corps is valuable to the military.

Other Volunteer Programs

Other Volunteer Programs include minor support for the Rural Youth Service Demonstration Project, Head Start, and Employee-based Retiree Volunteer Programs. The Commission is authorized to make grants for these programs but the Act neither stresses the importance of these projects nor does it authorize any funding for them.

Given the lack of attention given to these programs in the Act, there is little ground on which to speculate how these programs could aid the military. The programs under

this portion of the Act are not even remotely similar to military peacetime contingency missions. The bottom line is that these programs are of no value to the military, consequently, they do not warrant any military support.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis investigated the historic relationship between national service and the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and analyzed how the changing trends in the national security environment will affect that relationship. The research question posed in the thesis was this: is it feasible for national service projects to dovetail with peacetime contingency missions so that the AVF should support national service? Evidence was developed in this paper to answer that question affirmatively. Selected national service projects can perform certain peacetime contingency missions and enhance military capabilities.

The success of the AVF has decoupled security concerns from the national service debate. The calls for national service are now based solely on fulfilling unmet social needs, consequently, the AVF ignores the issue of national service. However, changes in the security environment have altered the missions of the military. Evidence in this thesis suggests that the military should not ignore national service. Growing regional instability has increased the importance of peacetime contingency

missions; some of these missions are very similar to those performed by national service programs outlined in The National and Community Service Act of 1990 (the Act).

Criteria were developed in Chapter 4 that analyzed the feasible national service programs authorized in the Act and determined the value of these programs in supporting peacetime contingency missions. Value was assessed based on program relevancy, reliability, sufficiency, and timeliness in supporting the AVF. Because of the humanitarian and civic action (HCA) nature of many peacetime contingency missions, selected national service projects were found to be valuable in assisting the military perform these missions. This dovetailing of civilian operations with military missions is specific, limited, and speculative. Table 14 summarizes the findings of this thesis.

The three national service programs shown in Table 14 are the only programs in the Act that offer any meaningful assistance to the military. Of the three programs, only youth conservation programs offer more than a little help to the military. National service support for the peacetime contingency missions listed in Table 14 is not equal for each mission. The programs can assist the military in only three principal peacetime contingency missions: disaster relief, emergency assistance, and reconstitution. Support for nation assistance and security assistance is weak.

TABLE 14

USEFUL NATIONAL SERVICE PROGRAMS

National Service Program	Potential Peacetime Contingency Mission Filled
American Conservation Corps	Disaster relief Emergency assistance Nation assistance Reconstitute forces
National and Community Service Act Programs	Reconstitute forces
Peace Corps	Disaster relief Emergency assistance Security assistance Nation assistance

Disaster relief and emergency assistance are peacetime contingency missions that are most easily supported by national service programs. Youth conservation programs already perform these types of missions within the United States and could assist the military in these operations. Moreover, these programs appear to pay for themselves when used in these types of operations. In overseas areas, Peace Corps volunteers could coordinate their activities with the military and assist in these operations. This might allow DoD to eliminate military units whose retention in the Total Force is now de facto based on performing only HCA missions. These are units whose existence is maintained only through political influence and not because of military necessity. These

units once had wartime missions, but in the budget-cutting post-Cold War era, supporters of these units manage to retain these units in the force structure in order to perform civil operations and State missions. National service programs might be able to back-fill these military units whose only functions now appear to be disaster relief and emergency assistance operations.

Reconstitution is another peacetime contingency mission that can be performed by selected national service programs. In view of imminent military manpower cutbacks, conservation programs and expanded national service programs offer two of the few remaining mechanisms for salvaging the U.S. manpower mobilization base. Of the two programs, conservation programs offer the most promise. Although a nation-wide national service program might benefit the military vis-a-vis its reconstitution mission, the probability of needing reconstitution is small compared with the huge cost of such a program. National service programs can assist the military in its reconstitution efforts by instilling some discipline, civic pride, and responsibility in youths. Military support for these programs also gives the military some leadership laboratories for practicing its mobilization training skills.

It is time for senior military leaders to recognize the potential assistance that national service programs can render the military. While support for national service

remains high, and the nation's unemployment rate for teenagers also remains high, military leaders should make a decision to support selected service programs. Specifically, I recommend that the military pursue associations with youth conservation programs. These should be pilot programs that accept relief assistance and environmental clean-up assistance from these programs. In return, the military should enter into cooperative logistical agreements and consider providing organizational support. This support should be conditional and bilateral with individual conservation groups. The military should avoid providing support to parties that seek to expand national service programs into federal jobs programs. Such programs will embroil the military too deeply into social welfare issues with little compensating assistance for wartime readiness.

Aside from conservation programs, the Peace Corps offers particular promise to the military in the area of security assistance and disaster relief. The military should make friendly overtures to the Peace Corps and seek cooperative agreements with them. However, the feasibility of linking the Peace Corps and the military together for cooperative intelligence gathering is remote. Although the potential exists for a productive relationship between the two, regrettably, it is politically unlikely they can get together.

National service programs can enhance military capabilities. As these programs raise collective desires within youths to volunteer, they cause youths who would otherwise not enlist to agree to join the services. Additionally, military assistance to national service programs will allow the military to reap the following benefits:

1. Ground youths in some form of discipline,
2. Provide a semi-trained base of manpower from which to expand the military in wartime,
3. Improve military readiness by using cooperative programs as leadership laboratories and proxies for mobilization drills,
4. Train civilian groups to deal with civil defense and disaster relief operations,
5. Overcome the international suspicion that peacetime contingency missions are only designed to win popular support for the U.S. military.
6. Increase civic pride and responsibility and strengthen a sense of personal commitment within youths.

Areas for Further Research

The thesis concludes that selected national service programs offer assistance to the military in performing some of its peacetime contingency missions. This conclusion generates several areas for further study. If this

assistance is not forthcoming, how will the military receive help in the neglected peacetime contingency missions? Can the military perform these missions without any national service help? In those areas where national service provided little or no help to the military, how can national service programs be changed, or the Act rewritten, to upgrade this assistance to medium-level support? Can other organizations, such as the F.B.I., drug-suppression programs, police organizations, Explorer Clubs, or others also provide assistance to the military in peacetime contingency missions? Should the Act be modified or should its implementation be changed to assist the military and re-link national service with national security concerns? Should the military modify its peacetime contingency missions to accommodate more civilian assistance or should some military missions be dropped? All of these questions are fertile ground for additional research.

Another area that requires more research is the diverging trends in military versus national service recruiting practices. The military's recruiting standards are rising while at the same time the quality of volunteers in national service programs is falling. In fact, the majority of volunteers in national service programs are poorly educated and trained. The military will become more selective in the future and there will be fewer opportunities for the military to take advantage of national

service programs for assistance and recruiting prospects. More research is needed to find out why these trends are developing and what steps can be taken to change them.

The last area for future study involves the methodology used in this thesis. The relevancy, reliability, sufficiency, and timeliness criteria used in this paper to evaluate each of the national service programs was particularly useful in constructing the assessment matrix in Table 8. This methodology was a convenient way to conceptualize the advantages and disadvantages of competing public policy alternatives without the necessity of placing "hard" (and often-times misleading) numbers on the alternatives. Further research is warranted on determining the applicability of using this methodology to analyze problems in other fields. Researchers should determine which of the criteria could be more precisely defined, expanded, or deleted. Are alternative criteria better suited to the material analyzed in this paper?

It is uncertain what type of reception the military will give the assistance offered by national service programs. Despite its potential benefits, the qualitative value of this aid is open to speculation. The AVF may not want any help. Nonetheless, force reductions and budget cuts must compel creative thinking within the military. Rather than threaten the AVF, national service programs can help the military accomplish its peacetime contingency missions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Interviews and Oral Histories

Cheney, Dick. Secretary of Defense. Pi Sigma Alpha Lecture, 29 August 1991, given to the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., carried on C-SPAN.

Newspapers and Magazines

Adams, Gary L. and Dwain L. Crowson. "The Army National Guard in a Changing Strategic Environment." Military Review 71, no. 10 (October 1991): 35-44.

Adelsberger, Bernard. "Army Ups Bid to Cut Reserves." Army Times, 16 March 1992, 4.

Auster, Bruce B. "The Pentagon's Scramble to Stay Relevant." U.S. News and World Report (30 December/6 January 1992): 52.

Budiansky, Stephen and Bruce B. Auster. "Missions Implausible." U.S. News and World Report (14 October 1991): 24-31.

Cetron, Marvin and Owen Davies. "50 Trends Shaping the World." The Futurist (September-October 1991): 11-21.

Coates, Joseph F., et al. "Future Work." The Futurist (May-June 1991): 9-15.

Cohn, Bob. "Doing Something Meaningful." Newsweek 114 (28 August 1989): 38.

Gaillard, Regina. "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations." Military Review 71, no. 6 (June 1991): 30-41.

Gallup, George, Jr. "National Service." The Gallup Report no. 267 (December 1987): 20-23.

"Rediscover America," Money (November 1991): 13.

"Sam Nunn Wants You," The New Republic (6 June 1988): 4, 50.

Seigle, Greg. "Drawdown Targets Historic Guard Units."
Army Times, 16 March 1992, 10.

Tice, Jim. "Recruiting Year the Best and the Lightest."
Army Times, 28 October 1991, 2.

Weinberger, Casper W. "Should We Change the All-Volunteer
System?" Forbes 147 (15 April 1991): 33.

Government Publications

Burrelli, David F. Military Manpower Policy and the All-Volunteer Force. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 1986.

Bush, George H. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991.

Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 101st Congress. Serial No. 101-100. Hearing on H.R. 4330, The National Service Act of 1990. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990.

Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 101st Congress. Serial No. 101-121. Hearing on H.R. 4330, The National Service Act of 1990. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990.

Congressional Budget Office. Costs of Manning the Active-Duty Military. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980.

Congressional Budget Office. Costs of the National Service Act (H.R. 2206): A Technical Analysis. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980.

Congressional Budget Office. Improving Military Educational Benefits: Effects on Costs, Recruiting, and Retention. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982.

Congressional Budget Office. Improving the Army Reserves. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985.

Congressional Budget Office. National Service Programs and Their Effects on Military Manpower and Civilian Youth Programs. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978.

Congressional Budget Office. Quality Soldiers: Costs of Manning the Active Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1986.

Joint Economic Committee, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 2d Session. Economic Indicators. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January, 1992.

Labor and Human Resources Committee, United States Senate. Senate Report No. 101-176. National and Community Service Act of 1990. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990.

National Service. Congressional Digest 89 (May 1990): 131-160.

Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training. A Program for National Security. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947.

Reserve Forces Policy Board. Department of Defense. Reserve Component Programs: Fiscal Year 1990. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990.

Slackman, Joel N. U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Costs of the National Service Act. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980.

United States Army. FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990.

United States Commerce Department. Projections of the Population of the United States, by Age, Sex, and Race: 1988-2080. Current Population Reports, Series P-25. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989.

United States Commerce Department. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990.

United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News. 101st Congress-Second Session. Volume 7. Public Law 101-610 [S.1430]. St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co., 1991.

United States Department of Defense. Secretary of Defense: Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1991.

United States General Accounting Office. Military Compensation: Comparisons With Civilian Compensation and Related Issues. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1986.

United States General Accounting Office. Military Compensation: Key Concepts and Issues. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1986.

Books

Anderson, Martin. The Military Draft. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1982.

Anderson, Martin. Registration and the Draft. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1982.

Bauer, Theodore W. Human Resources and Defense Manpower. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983.

Betts, Richard K. "Conventional Forces: What Price Readiness," Brookings Reprint 395. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1983.

Binkin, Martin. America's Volunteer Military: Progress and Prospects. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1984.

Binkin, Martin and Irene Kyriakopoulos. Youth or Experience?: Manning the Modern Military. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1979.

Coffey, Kenneth J. Strategic Implications of the All-Volunteer Force. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979.

Cohen, Eric. Citizen and Soldier. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Committee for the Study of National Service. Washington, DC: Potomac Institute, 1979.

Conaty, Francis S. Is National Service Really Feasible?. Special Report of the Association of the United States Army. Arlington, VA: AUSA Landpower Education Fund, 1987.

Cooper, Richard V.L. Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1977.

- Cotterman, Robert F. Forecasting Enlistment Supply. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, July 1986.
- Danzig, Richard and Peter Szanton. National Service: What Would it Mean?. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986.
- Evers, Willianson M., ed. National Service: Pro and Con. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990.
- Fairchild, Byron and Jonathan Grossman. The Army and Industrial Manpower, United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959.
- Flynn, George O. The Mess in Washington: Manpower Mobilization in World War II. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979.
- Foster, Gregory D., et al., eds. The Strategic Dimension of Military Manpower. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987.
- Gallup, George, Jr. The Gallup Poll. Public Opinion 1984. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1984.
- Gallup, George, Jr. The Gallup Poll. Public Opinion 1986. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1986.
- Curtis L. Gilroy, ed., et al. Military Compensation and Personnel Retention. Alexandria, VA: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1991.
- Goodpaster, Andrew J., ed., et al. Toward a Consensus on Military Service. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.
- Merritt, Hardy L. and Luther F. Carter, eds. Mobilization and the National Defense. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985.
- Military Manpower Task Force: A Report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982.
- Nanney, James S. and Terrence J. Gough. U.S. Manpower Mobilization for World War II. U.S. Army Center of Military History, September 1982.

National Defense University. The Anthro Factor in Warfare: Conscripts, Volunteers, and Reserves. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988.

President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. New York: Macmillan Co., 1970.

Sherraden, Michael and Donald Eberly. National Service: Social, Economic and Military Impacts. New York: Pergamon Press, Inc, 1982.

Taylor, William J., Robert N. Kupperman, et al. Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000: Executive Summary. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Oct. 1981 - Nov. 1982.

Wilson, Bennie J., ed. The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985.

Unpublished Dissertations, Thesis, and Papers

Brennan, Gerald M. "Military's Peacetime Role (Implications of the Civilian Conservation Corps Experience)." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986.

Busby, Daniel J. "The Call for National Service and Its Economic Costs." Master of Science Thesis, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988.

Pike, Charles W. "A Comparative Analysis: Will the All-Volunteer Force or a Universal Military Training and Service Program Offer the Best Means of Assuring National Defense for the United States in the 1980s?" Lehigh University Doctoral Thesis, Lehigh University, 1983.

Articles

Altman, Stuart H. "Earnings, Unemployment and the Supply of Enlisted Volunteers." Journal of Human Resources 4, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 39-59.

- Ash, J. Colin K., Bernard Udis and Robert F. McNown.
"Enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force: A Military
Personnel Supply Model and Its Forecasts." American
Economic Review 73, no. 1 (March 1983): 145-55.
- Borcherding, T.E. "A Neglected Social Cost of a Voluntary
Military." American Economic Review 61, no. 1 (March
1971): 195-96.
- Griffith, Robert K., Jr. "About Face? The U.S. Army and
the Draft." Armed Forces & Society (Fall 1985): 108-128.
- Hosek, James R., Richard L. Fernandez, and David W.
Grissmer. "Enlisted Strength in the '80s: a Mid-
term Reassessment." Defense Management Journal
(Second Quarter 1985): 3-9.
- Moskos, Charles C. "How to Save the All-Volunteer Force."
Public Interest (Fall 1980): 74-89.
- Moskos, Charles C. and Peter Braestrup. "America's National
Security: The Human Element." Wilson Quarterly 7 5
(Winter 1983): 131-133.
- Wheeler, Jack C. "In Recruiting, Quality Is All." 41, no. 9
ARMY (September 1991): 35-43.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
2. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
3. Mr. Daniel W. Busby
33 Manitou Trail
White Plains, New York 10603
4. Mrs. Joyce E. Busby
6338 Oak Square East
Lakeland, Florida 33813
5. COL Alan D. Hobson
735 S. Elizabeth
Wichita, KS 67213
6. LTC Harold L. Hunter
DSRO (ATTN: Force Integration)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
7. COL Gerald W. McLaughlin
308 Ardmore Street
Blacksburg, Virginia 24060